The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE UNITED STATES: WIDENING THE BREACH WITH EUROPE 105 including soy. The two parties also agreed not to contravene the spirit of the agreement while negotiations continued. President Trump prom- ised not to impose new tariffs on cars while pro- gress was being made (although in August 2018 he restated his intention to do exactly this) and to reconsider US measures on steel and alu- minium. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, stated in July that he viewed the con- versations between Trump and Juncker as “use- ful”, but that he was not in favour of a “major new trade agreement” along the lines of the failed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). So far, soy has been a key element of the negotiations because of the European promise to increase imports of this product from the US. Although Europe is ready to defend its indus- trial sector, these tariffs could have a protection- ist domino effect, damaging companies, em- ployees and consumers in the United States, the United Kingdom and many other trade partners, and ultimately giving nationalists and the European far right an electoral dividend. This is hardly the moment to escalate tensions further. Finally, another focus of problems has been the intensification of debate about the tax regu- lation of the “GAFAM” (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft). This is closely tied to wider European efforts to reduce the conti- nent’s dependency on US technology firms, which include regulations and directives already implemented by Brussels, and measures such as the fine imposed on Apple by the European Commission for unpaid taxes worth more than 14 billion euros. Security and NATO: closing the US umbrella In June 2018, less than a week after Chancellor Merkel had met President Trump at the G7 sum- mit in Canada, Germany’s newly appointed Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, set out the German and European position. Between Trumps’ “selfish policy of America First” and the threats from Russia and China, Germany need- ed to lead a convincing European response and to resume global leadership. In July, on the final day of the NATO summit in Brussels, the German chancellor proposed an emergency meeting be- hind closed doors, following statements by the US president in which he had questioned the purpose of NATO and trade with Europe. Many European governments felt that US complaints at bearing at least 70 per cent of the cost of NATO military expenditure provided no political incentive to increase spending, and failed to put such spending in the context of national budg- ets or consider factors such as foreign missions. At the same time, US insistence on a target of 2 per cent of GDP reflected an attempt to redirect investment and sales to benefit North American arms manufacturers, and not to lose ground in the technology race with Europe. Paradoxically, in response to US threats to withdraw, the EU has made progress over the last year towards defining a number of initia- tives designed to provide Europe with strategic autonomy. These include Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), an initiative to develop, fund and operate European defence and secu- rity capacities. And the European Intervention Initiative, proposed by French president, Emmanuel Macron, consisting in a coalition of volunteers not subject to EU institutions or Member states, which would be responsible for the rapid deployment of troops in crisis