The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 114 such as projects for the Land, Sea and Air Forces and in cyber defence, and for joint capacities to fill operational gaps. All of these provide exam- ples that we could cite here. However, it is also clear that the really impor- tant projects are those directed and implement- ed by the four lead states: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. As a result, although there are no formal rules establishing the leadership of these four countries, the dominant role they play in these projects makes it clear that, in real- ity, they have greater weight within the PESCO. With a target date of 2025 for completion of the PESCO project, only one group was pro- posed for the first year, although the hope is that, over the course of the coming months and years, this number will rise to around a hundred. We are therefore still at a very early stage and do not yet know exactly what direction the pro- ject will take, although we do know that the projects approved to date are extremely varied and have a very different scope and scale, in terms of defence objectives, budget size and the number of participating states. The limits of development of PESCO As we have seen, there were a number of very important developments in this area in 2018. However, there are also some limits. These de- rive, to a large degree, from the decision adopt- ed in December 2017, which involved an exten- sive interpretation of the regulations established in the EU treaty, setting aside the objective es- tablished in article 42.7 TEU stating that the aim was to include those Member states with the greatest capacities and thus, by implication, only a limited number of them. Instead, the decision was to accept all 25, in line with the German proposal and against the views of France. This will have the advantage of integrating the capacities of all members, who will then feel ownership of the project, despite the restrictions in terms of the challenges of cre- ating a visible and operationally effective inter- vention force. The decision not to follow through on the French proposal of a European intervention force that guarantees the territorial integrity of Member states has thus given rise to the European intervention initiative, another French proposal, designed to meet the same objectives. Specifically, France proposed that a significant group of Member states should sign a letter of intent in this regard, in the light of perceived potential threats in the near future. The result was the European Intervention Initiative, signed on 25 June 2018, which in- cludes nine Member states. This is defined as a non-binding forum of European states that wish to use their military capacities and forces, when- ever and wherever necessary, to protect European security interests, but without under- mining the institutional framework of the EU, NATO, the UN or temporary coalitions. The ini- tiative was strongly promoted by Emmanuel Macron, and its ultimate objective is to develop a shared strategic culture to improve the capac- ity of Member states. The Spanish contribution to the CSDP and, in particular, to PESCO During 2018, and despite a change of govern- ment and of political leadership, Spain played a major role in developing the CSDP, and is one of the leaders of PESCO. This has positioned it not just as one of the driving forces behind the re- launch of a European defence strategy, but as a founder of PESCO with a special status as a