The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 116 It is particularly noteworthy that, when it communicated its intention to leave the EU, the UK government indicated that, in the absence of a positive agreement with regard to the fu- ture economic relationship with the EU, the UK would no longer participate in collective security projects. Two years later, the situation is almost the opposite. Now, although in principle the UK still intends to leave, its position with regard to collective security has changed significantly in a number of ways, as was clear from the letter of intentions on the intervention force, approved on 25 June 2018. At the same time, this has created an op- portunity for Spain, both in general and within the defence sphere. As a result of the UK’s with- drawal and the change of government in Italy in spring 2018, there was talk for the first time of a Group of Three, consisting of France, Germany and Spain, with Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas, using the phrase in a wide- ly-reported lecture at the Complutense University in Madrid in December. During 2018, Spain consolidated the advan- tages it will gain in the defence sphere as a re- sult of the UK’s withdrawal, both in terms of its leadership as a member of the PESCO Group of Four, making progress with important pro- grammes in which the country is a participant, as a result of the decision to make Rota a gen- eral operational HQ, and the fact that Spain will direct Operation Atalanta. Conclusion: developing the security and defence policy represents progress towards a union that protects its citizens There is a new dynamic, which has grown out of the treaty provisions to enable a group of states to guarantee the security of the EU, so that it can protect its members and its citizens. The fact that this strengthened cooperation will be delivered not just by those Member states with the greatest capacities but by almost all the EU countries means that everyone will feel that they are part of a Europe that protects them, even if – as noted above – this inclusiveness re- duces the effectiveness of the policy and means it will take longer to implement. From this analysis of the key developments in 2018, it is worth highlighting that, while the structure of defence policy remains fundamen- tally inter-governmental, it is also starting to produce federal effects by strengthening European identity, by using a joint European budget in this area for the first time (a budget that, in the financial outlook for 2021–2027 is scheduled to be very significant) and, finally, be- cause PESCO decisions can be taken on a major- ity basis, even though they will be binding on all of the individual PESCO Member states. This is in some ways parallel to what has happened with the Erasmus programmes, which are clear- ly inter-governmental, and even include some states that are not members of the EU, but which at the same time have unquestionably had a federalizing effect. PESCO may be the start of a new and ex- tremely important stage, whose effects will only become evident in the medium term. Some have argued that it could be as important as monetary union, and with a similarly federalist impact. One difference, though, is that mone- tary union had an immediate impact when it was introduced, twenty years ago, while the ef- fects of PESCO will only be felt over the medium and long term, and this makes it very difficult to evaluate its true scope, even if it is clearly impor- tant.