The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 18 Political changes in 2018: going back, or going back to count for something in Europe? Unlike on those occasions, in 2018 the political changes in Spain have introduced the variable of pro-activeness. Unlike a Rajoy on the sidelines of events in the EU, with a minimal desire to be an active member of the European vanguard alongside Germany and France, and who was virtually in- visible at European Council meetings, Prime Minister Sánchez made it abundantly clear that Europe was a priority. From the outset, the Socialist defined his government as pro-European and has been very proactive indeed in highlighting Spain’s deter- mination to participate with proposals in that EU vanguard. Without a doubt, it has been very well re- ceived by the community institutions in Brussels and by Berlin and Paris, for finally the eurozone’s fourth-biggest economy has begun to play the role befitting it as a necessary ally in shaping the present and the future of the EU. In that respect, particularly significant – though perhaps not afforded the proper impor- tance publicly – was the German foreign minis- ter’s assertion in a debate in Madrid with Josep Borrell, his Spanish counterpart, explicitly plac- ing Spain, perhaps for the first time in commu- nity history, as the third pillar of the Franco- German axis. With the best of intentions, but not without certain exaggeration, it has often been said that with Rajoy Spain strayed from the EU and with Sanchez it returned to the fold, when it would probably be more accurate to say that the Socialist has gone back to counting in Europe. So, the difference before and after the vote of no confidence is not so much that there has been a change of positions, rather that now there is a desire to express them and assert them in the company of others. That allows us to return for a moment to the well-known debate over Spain’s weight in the EU, which both the government of Aznar and many diplomats and analysts understood in the formal manner – in the Treaty – of majorities in the Council of the EU and the European Council. Thus the replacement of the weighting of votes by the parameters of population and number of states would in practice mean crushing Spain’s influence in Brussels, when in fact the weight of a country in the EU does not hang on it going on the defensive, digging in against the rest in such and such numbers, but on its capacity to form positive alliances, as the European policy of Felipe González showed in practice time and again. It can be clearly inferred from the discourse of the Sánchez government that it is the second conception that takes precedence, along with another often asserted by González: the win- ning combination is to make the interests of Spain match the interests of Europe. The proactive approach of the present gov- ernment is moving in that direction and the re- sults obtained in the first few months of its ten- ure testify to the success of its policy, particularly in view of the complex political situ- ation that numerous member states are going through. To be fair, we should also say that Spain’s new proactive role in the EU is feasible because the country, still with its limitations, has to a large extent emerged from the economic tur- moil that gripped it during the crisis, took it to the brink of a full-blown bailout on more than one occasion and required a bailout of the banks.