The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE EU: A THREAT TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 47 around 6 million first-generation immigrants and 7 million second-generation immigrants. People with a migrant background have a be- low-average level of participation in the labour market, and an above-average level of unem- ployment. The unemployment rate among this group is approximately 20% – about twice as high as the rate for French people without a migrant background. Many migrants, particu- larly those living in the “banlieues”, are stigma- tised and discriminated against, leaving some of them so disappointed that they are driven into the arms of Islamist and terrorist subcultures in search of a new identity (Kepel, 2016). At the same time, the gap is growing among French people without a migrant background between the winners and losers of globalisation/ Europeanisation, offering fertile ground for the National Front. This dual division in French society means that while some people want to feel more secure by strengthening their religious identity, others seek new stability by strengthening their nationalist identity. Terror attacks by Jihadists fuel the FN, and its growing political successes provide ammunition for the Islamist ideology. Austria The rise of right-wing populism has played a more significant role in Austria than in any of the other countries described here – except for Italy. One indication of this is that the FPÖ under Jörg Haider had a large upswing in the 1990s, ena- bling them to join the government of Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP) from 1999 to 2006. The signifi- cance of right-wing populism can also be seen in reactions to the financial crisis since 2010: Austria has shifted towards right-wing nationalism both in society and politics, including the parties in the grand coalition, particularly the ÖVP. This development can only be understood in the context of the country’s historical tradition. Of the five determining factors for the growth of right-wing populism, the historical and cul- tural component is therefore dominant in Austria. After the financial crisis there has been eco- nomic stagnation in Austria: unemployment lev- els have been historically high for the country, wages have been shrinking slightly in real terms, and there have been tough austerity policies rather than any Austro-Keynesian response to the crisis. The socio-economic effects of the cri- sis have heightened fear of globalisation and Europeanisation among the working class and middle class. They have also led to increasing criticism of the ÖVP and SPÖ, the two parties that have shared power in Austria since 1945, ruling in a grand coalition for more than 50 years. As in the other countries under investiga- tion, the Austrian right-wing populist party takes up these socio-economic and political problems, and expresses them in a discourse that is anti-globalisation, anti-EU, against the established parties, and against foreigners. In Austria, as in the other countries, the refugee crisis has been used since 2015 by the FPÖ to brand migrants as the cause of the social crisis. However, the key difference with the four other countries is that the parties in the grand coali- tion have increasingly adapted to fit in with this anti-immigration discourse. This applies particu- larly to the ÖVP, but also to some extent among some portions of the SPÖ. Kurz’s party has even tried to go further to the right than the FPÖ. The abrupt shift to the right in Austria can be observed not just in the growing strength of the FPÖ. All political questions, including social questions, have taken on a nationalist tinge, even in the parties of the grand coalition, so