The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

RIGHT-WING POPULISM IN THE EU: A THREAT TO THE INTEGRATION PROCESS 51 of the “Yellow Vests”, and if his reform pro- gramme fails and he has few socio-economic successes to show at the next presidential elec- tions, he might well lose to a far-left or far-right candidate. The success of the “Yellow Vests” in their fight against Macron’s policies in late 2018 has exacerbated this structural instability. Political instability has also increased in Austria, following the failure of the grand coali- tion and the formation of an ÖVP-FPÖ govern- ment after the 2017 election. The unions and the SPÖ fear that the country›s shift to the right might mean that the new coalition will abolish the system of chambers of labour. However, this system makes up the administrative, intellectual and ideological foundation of the unions, and if they were weakened it would also hit the SPÖ hard. It appears that these possible develop- ments may spell the end of the period of grand coalitions and consensus democracy. As described above, the power of the parties in the grand coalition has been crumbling in Germany, while the Greens and the AfD have made significant progress in the polls. Following the election of Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer as the new leader of the CDU, it is unclear how long Angela Merkel will stay on as Chancellor. It could lead to the end of the grand coalition, new elections, and a “Jamaica coalition” (a coa- lition of the CDU/CSU, the FDP and the Greens). Merkel›s loss of power and the shift to the right within the CDU/CSU are also largely a result of the rise of right-wing populism. The increase in political instability, the sig- nificant losses suffered by conservative and so- cial-democratic parties, and the rise of right- wing populism will also have a considerable effect on the European Parliament elections in May 2019 (see Körner, 2018). The previously dominant grand coalition of the EPP and S&D, which was important for the stability of the legislative process, will probably lose its absolute majority. The EPP might get 25% of the seats (down 4 points), the S&D could lose out more, and get 19% (down 6 points). Depending on the alignment of Macron›s LREM, the liberal ALDE might get 10-13%. The largest gains would go to the anti-Europeans and Eurosceptics (ENF, EFDD, ECR), who could grow from 18% to about 25%. This would not mean the change in power announced by Salvini, di Maio and Le Pen, but it would complicate the legislative process. Building a coalition to pass laws would now re- quire not just the EPP and the S&D, but also the Liberals and/or the Greens (see Wientzek 2018). Right-wing populism blocks the resolution of integration conflicts The EU and the eurozone have been unable to solve problems that they are currently fighting on different fronts. On the contrary, the road- blocks seem to be growing. The most significant conflicts include: – The exit of Great Britain from the EU, which may happen in Spring 2019 without a deal. – The smouldering refugee crisis; the EU has not been able to implement an obligatory distribution mechanism in this context, al- though it is a European competence. – A debate has been running since the height of the Euro crisis in 2011/2012, regarding the reforms needed to stabilise the euro- zone; these reforms suffered a great setback at the summit in December 2018. – There has been a breakdown of democracy and the rule of law in Poland, Hungary and Romania, and the EU has been unable to de- flect these states from the path to “illiberal democracy”.