The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 62 were in national constituencies, and if there were transnational tickets, even only partially, the perception of voting for common institu- tions would be much greater. The resolutions passed in the European Parliament get very little coverage – or none at all – in the member states. The media rarely bother with them, the vast majority of the pop- ulation is unaware of them. The general sensa- tion is that the institution serves little purpose and that the decisions are taken in the European Council, or to be more precise, by one or some of its leaders. However, the European Parliament – as a community institution chosen by direct suffrage – is the only one in which European citizens can see they are represented and the only one that can offer them guarantees of democracy and direct accountability. If we wish to combat the population’s disaffection, it is necessary to strengthen it and place it at the forefront of the community architecture. First, by scrapping the special legislative procedures – or consultation procedures – and extending the ordinary legisla- tive procedure – or the European Parliament’s codecision with the Council – to all matters, those of an economic nature too (including those relating to taxes), as well as international agreements within the framework of the CFSP. In addition, it should also have full legislative initiative, like the Council, without prejudice to the preference of the European Commission for drafting projects. It should also be given the power to bring a constructive motion of censure on the president of the Commission, by abso- lute majority. Finally, it needs a voting procedure for matters relating to the euro – similar to that of the Ecofin – that guarantees a majority for the member states that have the single curren- cy, even if the debates extend to the entire European Parliament. Set up in this way and with those competences, it would become a true federal lower chamber and would be better understood and supported by the majority of European citizens. The European Commission, meanwhile, has to be the true European government, the Union’s only executive power, except in those matters explicitly reserved for the European Council, which, as we have said, should be kept to a minimum. To take on this role, the European Commission needs to be completely independ- ent, free from all influence or mediatisation by the member states, which already have their channels – the Council and European Council – to make their influence felt within the EU’s institutional whole. That is not happening now. Under the current system, the commissioners are actually appointed by the member states, according to the political colour of their govern- ments. This means that the European Commission is always a college made up – at least – of People’s Party members, Socialists and Liberals, who objectively can only implement a technical programme, never a political one, since there is no unity of purpose among them (for example, in the outgoing European Commission the Education and Youth Commissioner is from Hungary’s Fidesz and the Economic Affairs Commissioner is from the French Socialist Party). The member states, then, exercise constant influence in the European Commission since, in the last instance, one is responsible – and normally loyal – to who really appoints them, which in the case of the Commissioners is the government of their coun- try, not the president of the Commission. It is therefore difficult for them to act with neutral- ity when something affects the country they are from. Still, the worst effect of this system is that the European voter finds that, in fact, no matter