The State of the European Union. The European Parliament faces its most important elections yet

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 66 outcome. It is essential that the process of draw- ing up the proposal is participative, open, inclu- sive and transparent, and that it involves the civil society of each of the member states, through debates that are open to citizens, seek- ing the cooperation of the media to disseminate the proposals and its treatment, involving par- ties, unions, nongovernmental organisations and associations. In other words, it is essential that the debate is in the street and that citizens are aware of the scope of what is under discus- sion and how it might affect their lives. Only then will the reform move out of political circles that are sometimes poorly understood by the majority of the population and acquire a social legitimacy that will be very useful when the times comes for ratification. Apart from the in- terests of certain national political players, the failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 was prob- ably down to the population’s lack of knowl- edge about the content of the proposal, its causes and its goals. As for the final process of reform, Section 4 of Article 48 of the TEU states literally that “… the amendments shall enter into force after be- ing ratified by all the member states in accord- ance with their respective constitutional require- ments”, and that is without doubt the most conflictive and complicated aspect of the reform process. Firstly, because it contravenes the princi- ple of dual legitimacy derived from the states and the people that is fundamental to the Union. There are member states in which ratification re- quires a referendum, others in which a nonbind- ing vote is carried out and still others in which voters are not consulted. Therefore, not all European citizens will vote on the reform of the treaties, the European populace is fragmented and even those who do vote will not do so simul- taneously, which means that the vote of some may influence that of others. To maintain dual legitimacy, the appropriate procedure would be for the reform to be approved first by the govern- ments of the member states, then by the European Parliament and after that a European referendum would be called in which all the citi- zens of the Union would participate, to approve the reform by simple majority in a single, Europewide constituency. That would be final proof of the existence of a European sovereignty and would give the people the definitive percep- tion that the EU belongs to them and that they are responsible for it. Unanimity also makes it very difficult for any reform of certain depth to prosper and provides member states – particularly the smaller ones – with a powerful negotiating tool to obtain ad- vantages and exceptions, as was the case of Denmark in 1993 in relation to the Treaty of Maastricht and of Ireland in 2002 in relation to the Treaty of Nice. The Spinelli Group proposes that subsequent amendments to the treaties should not require unanimity and can enter into force when they have been approved by four fifths of the member states that represent at least three quarters of the population. The member states that do not approve the reform would be offered a statute of association. Evidently, this would be a great step forward that would facilitate reforms that can currently be blocked by just one member state. It would probably deter some from the temptation of not ratifying. However, that is impossible on this oc- casion, because the reform has to be done in accordance with what is laid down in the cur- rent TEU, and while Section 5 of Article 48 states that “…if, two years after the signature of a treaty amending the Treaties, four fifths of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered difficul- ties in proceeding with ratification, the matter