THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

111 The future architecture of European security José Enrique de Ayala In January 2021 two events took place that are set to mark the start of a new era in the European Union (EU) to varying degrees: the departure of the United Kingdom (UK), which was completed on 1 January after the approval of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the two parties in December 2020, and the accession to the presidency of the United States of Joe Biden, who took office on 20 January, though perhaps the most important thing for the EU was the exit from the White House of his predecessor, Donald Trump. The two events will also affect the future of the European security architecture, which in its current setup had already been displaying certain dysfunctions and had been the target of criticism from various political and social sectors of the EU. It must necessarily evolve to adapt to the new geopolitical circumstances. The consequences of Brexit for European security The effects of Brexit will take some time yet to fully ma- terialise, particularly in certain areas such as security and defence, where no specific agreements have been signed. However, there are certain consequences that can already be assessed. The first is that a state with a very significant military capability, the biggest of all its members in many respects, has left the EU. The UK has very powerful and well-trained armed forces, particularly the navy, although its two new aircraft carriers are not nuclear-powered and need US F-35Bs to operate. It also possesses a significant capability to attack with nuclear weapons, based on submarines, although in this case too it depends on the supply of Trident D5 missiles from the United States. The UK is also a power in terms of cybersecurity and intelligence, particularly signals, and has a strong defence industry. It would be a major loss for the EU in this field – if the EU had a common defence. But it does not have it yet. And since the UK still belongs to NATO, the loss in fact is only theoretical – for now. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the only attempt by the EU – a timid one so far – to have some minimal autonomy in this field, has enjoyed UK cooperation in its limited activities.The UK has taken part in certain CSDP operations and hosted one of the oper- ational HQs offered to the EU by the member states, at Northwood, which ran Operation Atalanta – an executive naval military operation to combat piracy in the western Indian Ocean – for over 10 years, to March 2019, when it was relieved by Rota (Spain). Departure from the EU would not stop the UK from continuing to take part in CSDP operations, should it be interested. In fact, ships from Norway and Ukraine, among others, which are not EU members, have taken part in the previously mentioned Operation Atalanta. Yet naturally the UK could no longer be responsible for commanding them. On the other hand, nor will the UK’s departure prevent maintaining cooper- ation on those security matters that affect both parties