THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 112 and in which cooperation is essential, such as terrorism, organised crime or the trafficking of people or drugs. The UK was actually one of the founders of the Euro- pean Security and Defence Policy – as it was first called – when in St. Malo in December 1998 it agreed with France to launch a European defence initiative limited to crisis operations, while NATO would remain the sole guarantor of collective defence 1 . When it was in the EU, the UK’s policy in this respect – always in line with its main ally, the United States – was geared exclusively to trying to improve the capabilities of the European armed forces to reinforce NATO, which it has always considered the only organisation responsible for defending the Euro- pean continent, via a fairer distribution of the load. It has systematically opposed any initiative that might increase European autonomy in defence matters, such as the cre- ation of a European Operations HQ for instance. It is not that it did not believe in the possibility of Europe taking responsibility for its own defence, it is that alternative held no appeal to London, which based – and bases – its strength on its relationship with the United States. In this respect, the UK’s departure may be a positive thing for the development of the CSDP. Its opposition to any decision that meant moving away from or reducing the influence of the United States on European security, seconded by several members states in Eastern Europe and even in the north, such as Denmark, in practice pre- vented any progress towards greater unity on defence issues in the EU, and therefore towards the so oft-men- tioned and desired strategic autonomy, which without a defence component would naturally be incomplete. In March 2021, just three months after Brexit was completed, London released the Integrated Review of Foreign and Defence Policy 2 , described as the most com- prehensive review of security and foreign policy matters 1  https://www.cvce.eu/obj/franco_british_st_malo_declaration_4_de- cember_1998-en-f3cd16fb-fc37-4d52-936f-c8e9bc80f24f.html 2  https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competi- tive_Age-_the_Integrated_Review_of_Security__Defence__Develop- ment_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf carried out by the UK since the end of the Cold War. It draws the strategic lines that will mark the future of the country after leaving the EU and is an extremely optimis- tic document that relishes the new era in which the UK is going to be a global power once more, with presence and influence throughout the world. A kind of return to the Victorian age, at least in its wishes and intentions. It places the centre of gravity of the new, independent UK in the Indo-Pacific area, while it barely addresses the EU and certainly not in defence terms, rather just its member states on an individual basis.We can gather from the text that the British government contemplates the possibility of reaching bilateral agreements with certain European countries, in the fashion of the Lancaster House Treaties of November 2010 with France, but not with the CSDP as a whole. The document points to Russia as the chief threat, in line with British tradition, and repeatedly em- phasises that the organisation responsible for guarantee- ing European security is NATO, in which the UK would act as a leader in Europe, given that it is one of the members that spends most on defence. The future of NATO as guarantor of collective defence What the UK is proposing after leaving the EU is that Europe maintain the same security architecture as in 1948: NATO with sole responsibility, led by Washington as the top chief in charge of the final decision, and Lon- don as its representative and delegate in Europe while the rest of the members act individually and, therefore, with limited if not zero influence. There have certainly been some substantial changes over the last seven de- cades that are hard to overlook: the Warsaw Pact does not exist, nor does the USSR, the destroyed and divided Europe after the Second World War – for which United States protection was an existential need – has deve- loped into a Union that together comprises the world’s second-biggest economic and trade power. Yet the UK means to circumvent this reality and maintain the prior