THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 114 the threats and the capabilities to confront them that pin- points duly analysed and assessed shortcomings to justify a relatively high investment figure that in some countries may be to the detriment of more pressing social spending. However, Washington’s approach was even more shameless.When in April 2019 the European Parliament approved the European Defence Fund (EDF) regulation, which allows the participation of non-EU companies in funded projects but demands that the intellectual proper- ty of the project be exclusively European, the US Defense Department reacted with an extremely tough letter ad- dressed to the High Representative in which it demanded a review of these conditions, and those of the projects included in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PE- SCO), with threats of possible political and commercial reprisals. It is not just a matter of the European states spending more on defence then, but of them spending more on US equipment and weapons systems, perhaps the industry with greatest political influence in the Unit- ed States. In other words, the same old story: military hegemony and economic subordination. Clearly the arrival in power in the United States of the Democrat administration, led by Joe Biden, has sig- nificantly changed the climate of understanding between the two sides of the Atlantic and given the Atlanticists some respite. Biden is open to dialogue and espouses a return to multilateralism and the importance of NATO for his country, for Europe and for the world. But it may be too late. Many Europeans – including some leaders – have realised that dependence on the United States is not reliable in the long term. Trump, or someone like him, may return since the Republican Party has conclu- sively adopted his political ideas. What’s more, with any administration the essential interests of the United States remain the same and currently those interests lie not in Europe but in the Indo-Pacific area, and more precisely in its struggle with the great emerging power, China. Biden’s visit to Europe between 11 and 15 June, his first trip abroad as President, pursued the same primary goal in each of its three facets – the economic one with the G-7, the political one with the EU, and the military one with NATO: garner Europe’s support in his inevita- ble confrontation with China, which is going to play out above all in the trade and technology fields. This support would appear to tip the competition in the Americans’ favour, at least for a few years, but it would have to be a little clearer what Europe gets from that alignment, because if the answer is nothing or even handicaps to its trade relations with China, the support may not ma- terialise, or not in the terms that Washington would like. In any case, raising this issue in NATO is stretching the Treaty too far. As French President Emanuel Macron said, China has little to do with the North Atlantic. Of course, a consultation mechanism exists as laid down in Article 3 (4?) of the NAT, but those consultations already take place between the allies on a bilateral level and are usu- ally more effective that way. Lastly, NATO has a major vulnerability, one that is very hard to overcome: Turkey. Since the attempted coup in 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has embarked upon a unilateral and interventionist international policy without considering his NATO allies, as demonstrated by his attack in northern Syria on the Kurdish militias of the YPG (People’s Protection Units). These are backed by the United States, with who they closely cooperated in the defeat of Islamic State. The entry of his ships into waters of the eastern Mediterranean claimed by Cyprus, which are not recognised internationally, to drill for hydrocar- bons has triggered deep displeasure in some allies, main- ly Greece. His intervention in the Libyan civil conflict, his support for the Government of National Accord of Fayez al-Sarraj, came close to sparking an armed confrontation with France 4 . While NATO has displayed enormous pa- tience with Ankara, it is going to be very tough to reach consensus and agree on joint action with an ally that has clearly decided to go it alone, for its sole benefit.Without some minimum consensus among all its members NATO’s capacity for action is severely curtailed. 4  Incident between the French frigate Courbet, which formed part of NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian for the arms embargo on Libya, and the Turkish frigate Oruçreis in June 2020.