THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

THE FUTURE ARCHITECTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY 117 Whenever the EU steps in, all the parties involved in the crisis know that it does not have a military force of its own to back up or assert its positions where necessary. As a result, they become less effective, to the benefit of other players, as for instance in Syria, where the EU barely carries any weight – despite suffering the con- sequences of the conflict – while Russia, with a much smaller economic, demographic and political capacity (and whose defence budget is far lower than the EU’s aggregate spending), plays a decisive role. European de- fence initiatives formed ad hoc even arise, such as the one for maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz (EMAS- OH), launched by France in January 2020 and joined by a further seven EU countries, which only goes to confirm the weakness of the CSDP. As far as self-defence is concerned, the EU contin- ues to rely on NATO – that is the United States – even though there are six member states that do not form part of the Atlantic Alliance. This causes a clear dysfunction because since the Lisbon Treaty the European Union is also a defensive alliance that binds all its members. The consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in Article 42.7 that if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states must provide aid and assistance by all the means in their power. With all the provisos that ac- company it, referring to the member states that are also members of NATO or those considered neutral, this is the classic wording of a mutual defence clause that obliges the parties, even though measures on an organisational level have not been taken nor have regulations been introduced to put this obligation into effect. In spite of repeated statements by major European leaders (Macron, Angela Merkel) in favour of the devel- opment of a common European defence, even a Europe- an army, the truth is that the principal measures for the relaunch the CSDP agreed in 2017, the implementation of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF), are aimed exclusively at improving military capabilities via cooperation on joint projects of the member states, fostering a competitive and efficient industrial and technological base of Euro- pean defence, which is undoubtedly positive and will lead to greater autonomy with regard to third countries. But they are not of an operational nature, they do not represent any command structure or forces that could be taken as a greater commitment to mutual defence, and they are not intended to be the foundation of a common European defence, let alone a European army, which would require a level of political commitment that does not exist yet. In other words, they are solid initia- tives, since one of the conditions for strategic autonomy is industrial autonomy, at least in essential sectors, but ones that prove insufficient. In November 2019, 13 new projects were approved in the framework of the PESCO, making a total of 47, although some of them are purely technical or doctrinal and others are well behind schedule.There have been no new projects since then and one has been completed. Meanwhile, the allocation for the EDF, a major initiative that for the first time employs resources from the EU’s common budget in financing research and development of defence equipment, which the Commission initially as- sessed at 13 billion euros for the period 2021-2027, was cut by nearly 40% to 8 billion in the final version of the multiannual financial framework approved in December 2020, owing to the approval of the NextGenerationEU recovery funds. Lastly, the European Operations HQ, which is imperative to equipping the EU with a credible operational capability of its own, has been reduced to the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) with limited personnel and only suitable for directing non-executive missions. Quite modest progress then. The EU has sufficient economic, industrial, techno- logical and human potential to build an autonomous collective defence to guarantee its security on its own in the face of present and foreseeable risks, which do not include the possibility of a high-intensity war in the con- tinent. This does not preclude its external allies coming to its aid if necessary, which they would surely do out of self-interest, just as the EU would if it were the other way around. It is not true that Europe cannot defend