THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 118 itself without the support of the United States, or that this option would be much more costly. Suffice to say that Russia’s defence budget in 2020 6 ($61.713 billion) was not much greater than that of France (52.747 billion) or Germany (52.765 billion) and came to a little over a quarter of the aggregate amount of the 27 members of the EU (232.807 billion), that is not including the UK now. And Russia does not appear to have any problems defending itself on that budget. It would certainly not be necessary to spend a single euro more to have an auton- omous European common defence capable of adequately protecting European citizens. Quite a lot of money could probably be saved by making the most of the Union’s synergies. True, there are vulnerabilities in certain capa- bilities, but it is not true that they cannot be overcome with purely European resources. Nor is it hard to do; it only requires a command structure of its own – which naturally could use existing European resources – and starting to coordinate capa- bilities, industries, services and doctrines, which should not be too difficult considering that the vast majority already follow NATO procedures. The obstacles are more of a political and ideological nature and can be summed up by a lack of mutual trust among the member states of the EU. Yet those obstacles must be overcome, because Eu- ropean security cannot continue to rely on an external power whose interest in it may shift with political move- ments and end up having very low priority. Without a collective defence capability of its own, the EU will never be completely sovereign, its foreign policy will always be constrained by that deficit and therefore subordinate to that of the United States (which clearly prioritises its own interests). And it cannot play the global role to the benefit of the interests and security of its citizens that its economy, its demography and its political potential warrant. 6  According to figures from the Stockholm International Peace Re- search Institute (SIPRI) for 2020, the last year available, in current dollars. Conclusion Brexit does not alter the fact that the European security architecture remains the same as in the 1940s, while the strategic framework has undergone radical change. On the contrary, more than ever a UK outside the EU promotes the United States’ influence in Europe and, therefore, NATO as the sole guarantor of the continent’s security. But NATO, as it was founded over 70 years ago in the post-war period, is dysfunctional. It has no clear goals, nor does it have the means to achieve the new goals being proposed (and which are not provided for in the Treaty), or does it have a unity of purpose or interests (remember the case of Turkey once more). It is not the solution to try to draw the European countries to the Indo-Pacific area, where matters of little interest to most of the allies on this side of the Atlantic are being settled. It is not enough to raise the spectre of a hyperaggressive Russia that could threaten European security, because what interests Europe is a cooperative Russia, one that is as close as possible to European political standards, and that can only be achieved through dialogue. Under the current circumstances, the bid to continue maintaining NATO as the only security architecture in the European continent is hard to justify and it can only be down to partisan political interests. It is necessary to reiterate that the creation of a Eu- ropean Union of Defence would not imply any split. This initiative should not put an end to transatlantic relations, not in defence matters either, but rather only improve them. NATO as it stands – one hegemonic power and 29 minions –no longer corresponds with the geopolitical reality in this region of the world. An EU equipped with an adequate defence capability of its own would be in a position to sign a mutual defence treaty with the United States, a new alliance, on equal terms, which other non- EU member countries could join – with the UK at the head, of course –, and which would constitute a highly desirable guarantee of common security, all the more so if it is framed in a more ambitious cooperation and