THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION REPORT. Europe in a period of transition

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 20 Proposals to bring elections closer to citizens and ensure their vote influences the direction of politics As Dahl notes, it is an essential characteristic of demo- cracy that a majority of citizens, through their vote, can decide both who governs them and the direction of the political decisions taken by their rulers. In order to take such decisions, citizens must be sufficiently aware of the political system and of the political options at stake. This means there is a dual dimension: the capacity of citizens to choose the government and its agenda, and the need for greater awareness of the European political system. Although participation rose notably in the 2019 elec- tions, there is still a significant problem of non-partici- pation, which has multiple causes but in particular the perceived distance of citizens from the institution of the European Parliament itself (Clark, 2014). This is a system with which they are unfamiliar and they struggle to see the effect of their votes, as a result of which elections to it are seen as being of the second order (Reiff and Schmitt, 1980). Additional problems are the exclusively national character of the elections and the fact that national po- litical parties do not see it as a priority in their political strategies. The conference, however, could put forward a range of measures of differing scope which could help to achieve this dual objective: ensuring that citizens’ votes count, and bringing European politics closer to them. Since the European Parliament was elected by direct universal suffrage for the first time in 1979, its powers have grown with respect to co-legislation, budgets and political control. However, abstention levels (49.34 per cent in 2019) suggest that citizens are not aware of this. In parallel, the impact of the citizen’s vote on European governance has also increased very significantly: from a Commission chosen only by representatives of national governments to one that cannot be appointed without the Parliament’s approval (Gil-Robles, 2015). In 2014, this enabled European political groups to organise them- selves to name Spitzenkandidaten or lead candidates, and to persuade the European Council to agree to elect as President of the Commission the candidate of the party that won the European elections.This saw the elec- tion of Jean-Claude Juncker, a political president with a high degree of legitimacy, who led a Commission with a powerful political agenda and with a greater level of in- dependence than its predecessors (Dinan 2016).This loss of control explains the fact that in 2019 the European Council refused to appoint ManfredWeber, the candidate of the European People’s Party, and proposed Ursula von der Leyen in his place. This was seen as a setback for European democracy but reflected, rather, the struggle of the European Council to reaffirm its power over the Parliament and its control over European policy (Guinea, 2020b: 175-178). The informal experience of the Spitzenkandidaten was a positive one, both because it allowed citizens to identify their vote with a face, a programme and a po- litical direction, and because it politically strengthened the Commission. It is a measure that strengthens the democratic character of the EU, in the direction proposed by Dahl, while also bringing European politics closer to its citizens. This is why we support the European Parliament and the Commission itself in arguing that this practice should be institutionalised. The ideal solution would be through Treaty reform but if this is not possible it could also be achieved through an inter-institutional agree- ment between the Parliament and the European Council to democratise the EU. To achieve our dual objective, the Spitzenkandidat- en initiative should be accompanied by other proposals, such as transnational lists, a single Europe-wide electoral programme for each party, a uniform electoral law, and adaptation to the political cycle of the pluri-annual fi- nancial framework.The “transnational lists” would entail creating a single Europe-wide constituency with a limited number of members, who would be chosen by the major- ity system, in addition to deputies elected at the level of the Member state. In European elections, citizens would cast two ballots: one for the candidates representing the individual Member state and the other for those on the transnational list. This initiative was debated in the Eu-