THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 74 the invasion of Ukraine which it launched on 24 February, two days after recognising the independence of both republics. The current war clearly began back in 2014. Russia has always considered Ukraine crucial, not only for security reasons but also politically and historically, and it is not prepared to just let it go into the West’s sphere of influence. Stability has evaded Europe since the end of the cold war. In addition to the matter of the Western Balkans - still not completely resolved - after successive exten- sions of NATO, five post-Soviet countries remain: Bela- rus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,Armenia and Azerbaijan, differing vastly from each other, that the EU has offered to help through the Eastern Partnership, without a clear security strategy, leading to various tense episodes. The geopolitical approaches that were applied in Europe from 1990 onwards were not successful. Neither NATO’s atti- tude to make the most of the fall of the Soviet Union by expanding throughout Europe and marginalising Russia, nor Russia attempting to maintain its prior influence in its close geographic surroundings, have led to more stability and more security in the continent. It would be fair to say that more increasingly-serious conflicts have ramped up to the current war in Ukraine. There is no other lesson to learn here other than cooperation and dialogue, resolv- ing conflicts by putting forward reasonable and viable proposals, are always preferable to confrontation, even for the side that considers itself to be superior at a given time. Geopolitics require a very accurate assessment of the cost-benefit ratio and a broad view of the future. Not all leaders possess that on every occasion. Much has been said about what we might call the “Versailles trap”, that would push a country beaten in war, subjected to excessive pressure and humiliation in its defeat, to become aggressive again and try to recover its lost status as soon as it possibly can. In fact, the Treaty of Versailles, that brought World War One to a close in 1919, subjected Germany to conditions so hard that they led - along with other reasons, such as the repercussion of the financial crash of 1929 - to the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazism, that in turn led toWorld War Two.The end of that war brought a radically different strategy: support was given to the State created in West Germany by the allies, the Federal Republic, and it was politically and economically integrated. This led to total reconciliation and the creation of the European Commu- nities and subsequently the European Union. As the heir and main country of the Soviet Union, Russia was the great loser in the ColdWar, but it did not receive the help to recover and integrate that Germany did in the 1950s. Economically, it had every opportunity - squandered by the colossal corruption of the Yeltsin era - but in political and security fields it was relegated to become a mere spectator of what was happening in Europe, without se- riously considering its interests or concerns. Altogether, this created resentment, particularly in more nationalist sectors, so conflict could be predicted when the country recovered part of its strength.This is a lesson that should never be forgotten: the loser should not be humiliated, because these strong feelings can lead to violence, even against their own interests. The Strategy The first parameter in any strategy is ultimately how we wish this situation to end. Once decided, we must as- sess whether it can be achieved with our own resources despite opposition from our adversary, considering all the conditioning factors and variables in the surround- ing area. Only after this step can specific and successive goals be outlined. Regarding Russia, it is not easy to determine the initial ultimate goal of the “special military operation” launched by the Russian government on 24 February. Possibly only the Russian General Staff and Putin’s clos- est political circles might be aware of his real intentions and his strategic approach has possibly been changing as operations have progressed. It has been speculated that the Russians intended to invade Ukraine entirely and set up a sympathetic government in Kiev. Howev- er, this analysis is not well founded, the Russian troops