THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

Lessons learned from the war in Ukraine 77 The Tactics Another subject that has aroused interest among military analysts is how an army such as in Ukraine, theoretically very inferior, has stood up so well to Russian attacks and continues to see them off. There are many factors in play to help this happen, and not only deny the Russian forces their quick victory, but also inflict significant losses on them, although this is still hard to quantify, in terms of troops and material. The Russian land army has many shortfalls and weak- nesses. Part of its equipment has been poorly maintained or has become obsolete. In the field of communications, for instance, they have sometimes had to use unpro- tected systems or even commercial networks, which has allowed the location of units and high-ranking officers to be pinpointed - and possibly destroyed. The defence budget, approximately the same as for the United King- dom and slightly higher than for Germany or France, has been channelled into the aerospace sector, and the latest missiles, strategic weapons in other words, and this war has laid bare the significant weaknesses of both the army and the navy. Logistical issues have proved to be a very serious vulnerability for the Russian army in these opera- tions, particularly when supply lines were stretched as in the northern offensive and around Kiev, and no military action is possible without logistics. Perhaps Russia chose to concentrate on the east of Ukraine, in addition to the reasons mentioned above, to simplify logistics. There are also clearly fewer Russian troops. Presi- dent Zelensky declared in May that 700,000 Ukrainian soldiers were actively defending their country, and this figure could now be much higher, close to one million. Russia has kept a force of around 200,000 in the war, although this figure may have risen by another 50,000 or 60,000 soldiers over the last few months.The proportion is an exactly representation of classic figures for attack and defence, although in favour of Ukraine. It is widely known that all Ukrainian men aged between 18 and 60 have been called up, either to fight or as auxiliary forces, for support or as reserves, and we are talking about over 12 million people, although of course not all of them have weapons or military training. Russia has not carried out any type of mobilisation, as it is not officially at war, but it has recruited volunteers - offering high pay and administrative benefits, it has employed experienced fighters from Chechnya, and brought in some troops from other countries such as Syria and the like, which always causes command difficulties. There is another enormously important aspect to this type of war, which is to question the motivation for an- yone taking part in it, the morale of the fighters, or the will to win, as people like to call it. The Ukrainians are defending their land, their homes, their properties, their families, and their motivation to fight is so much greater than for the Russian soldiers, who have been sent to a war far from home. Most of them probably have no idea why Ukraine is being liberated or any great desire to liberate it, and many of them are only there for the money or other benefits as mentioned above. It is not unusual that, under equal conditions, people with an existential interest in winning succeed. However, some fighters on both sides have been ideologically radicalised and some - Russian as far as we know - have committed unacceptable atrocities. Nor is Russia superior in terms of equipment or ma- terials, except regarding missiles, and its navy and air force. The use of cruise missiles such as Kalibr or ballistic missiles such as the Iskander-M, even some hypersonic missiles such as Kinzhal, not only in the area of opera- tions but throughout the country, has allowed the Rus- sians to keep up the pressure and balance out other Ukrainian advantages. However, numbers are limited, and they might already be scarce, as they are beginning to use anti-aircraft S 300 missiles for land attacks. In any case, missiles can help, but are not decisive in land combat. As for the Navy, they have hardly been able to demonstrate their superiority as there has been no naval combat: Ukraine has not taken the battle to the sea. Furthermore, Russian ships cannot get near the coast for fear of being reached by Ukrainian missiles, as hap- pened with the Moskva, the flagship of the Black Sea