THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 78 fleet. Even more surprising is the slim advantage that Russia is obtaining from its greater air power, apart from never having used strategic bombing raids, perhaps for political reasons. Let’s not forget that at the start of the war the Russians had ten times more fighter bombers. The Russian air force has never managed to gain the air supremacy that seemed extremely likely. Although it has obtained high degrees of superiority depending on the region, a few Ukrainian planes have continued flying and, above all, they have not been capable of wiping out all the Ukrainian air defences, particularly the earth-to-air missiles, such as the Stinger that, although only used at low altitude, are sufficient to prevent air support close to the land-based units, that is occasionally decisive and has barely been used by the Russian forces. It is exactly this employment of sophisticated weap- ons supplied by Western countries - not only during the war but since 2014 - that has allowed Ukraine to hold out until now.Alongside the aforementioned Stinger, there is the magnificent Javelin, a portable anti-tank weapon that is so extraordinarily effective that some analysts have gone so far as to predict that armoured vehicles will no longer be used in land combat, although this would only be applicable to certain tactical scenarios, such as urban combat or large columns close to cities. There is also the highly effective Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone that has been used against armoured vehicles as well. In any case, these weapons - just like other anti-aircraft or an- ti-tank weapons supplied to Ukraine - are merely defen- sive. They cannot be used to attack, although they can help of course. Kiev has requested weapons with greater reach and power with the idea that they can reverse the situation, such as Patriot anti-missile batteries or against high altitude planes, that have not been supplied so far. The arrival of multiple launch rocket systems, such as HIMARS - with a 80 kilometre range, has allowed the Ukrainians to attack facilities and stores in the Russian rear-guard in the occupied zones, but what Kiev wants are the ATACMS missiles, with a 160 km range, that can be launched from the HIMARS system or from the M142 that they also have, as well as planes and tanks. An entirely separate section could be written on oth- er Western supports, less prominent but none the less essential for Ukraine. In the West, thousands of people are working on the war in cyberspace, both defensive and offensive, particularly in the Baltic States, although as the Russian side has high capacity - including the use of civil groups that have been working independently for years with certain ties to the security services, there is some balance in this field. The West is clearly superior in the field of intelligence, particularly using satellites. Practically any movement of Russian forces, planes or ships can be monitored, and its players located in real time.This information is immediately sent to Ukraine and has given them some key victories, including sinking the Moskva, or destroying mobile control posts with high ranking officers. Furthermore, Western intelligence and operations specialists provide continuous support for Ukrainian decisions. On the other hand, the enormous media and propaganda work carried out by Western countries is no less important as it has managed to gain approval from the majority of the population for actions to support Ukraine, in all countries involved, and even a significant change in the perception of an alliance such as NATO in countries that had never been particularly keen such as Sweden or Finland. Finally, it is necessary to talk about ground tactics, that have differed vastly on either side. Russia attempt- ed a classic ground war from the beginning, with ar- moured units seeking to beat the opposing forces and subsequent occupation of the land. Ukraine refused this type of combat, that might damage it and chose another type of operation, more like guerrilla warfare, small units attacking the Russian columns, particularly the logis- tics, making the most of the aforementioned weapons without presenting a direct battle although wiping out sufficient enemy manpower to slow down or even stop their progress. Resistance has been instigated above all in cities, where the attacker loses any advantage, even at the cost of many civilian lives. For instance, tanks are extraordinarily vulnerable to Javelin-type weapons in ur- ban settings, as we said before, these remain decisive in