THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 80 of technological components due to sanctions, while the material that Ukraine might receive could be unlimited, particularly from the USA. In any case, many - not all - Western countries would like to see Russia weakened, but not destroyed, because a wounded beast can be very dangerous. In other words, like the French President Emmanuel Macron, they do not wish for “humiliation”. If the balance of strength were to shift and Russia felt that its territory was in danger - including Crimea - it might use tactical nuclear weapons to defend itself, which could get out of control. It is highly unlikely that this might happen, above all because Rus- sian territory is not going to be attacked, and the Kremlin cannot risk all-out war when it has everything to lose. The most likely scenario is that there will be a ceasefire in a few months, maybe in the winter, and peace talks can begin. As Russia is not going to withdraw from the territory that it is currently occupying and Ukraine is not going to accept any loss of land, the situation will stag- nate, and it will remain to be seen if the ceasefire holds or if fighting breaks out again and how intensely. In any case, non-peace of this type, an unacceptable situation for Kiev, would not make it possible lift the sanctions on Russia and so Europe would continue to siffer from the severe repercussions that these sanctions inflict on its economy. Globally, the West’s isolation of Russia would send the latter running into the arms of China, the only coun- try to have declared its support (alongside Belarus) al- though with certain reservations. Consequently, there would be two opposing blocks: one made up of the USA and the EU, plus a few sympathetic Asian countries, in other words a NATO+, against another block formed by China and Russia. This may lead to a new bipolar world in which the Global South, India, South-East Asia, Africa, Latin America, the countries that have never supported sanctions against Russia and that have enormous min- eral resources, would voice an opinion and it is possible that they might not find in favour of the West. This does not seem to be the best scenario for the EU, that has no security issues with China, and, as during the Cold War, it would find itself subject to decisions made in Washington, not only regarding security but also politics and economics. Conclusion The war was not started by Ukraine, NATO or the EU. Russia started it by infringing all international legality and the treaties and agreements that it had signed. It is clear that it had no right to make an attack like the one it launched, and nothing can justify it, as we said back at the start. However, without questioning the responsibility of what Putin and his circle of power has brought about, it is plausible that this war is the indirect consequence, at least partly, of a poor resolution to the end of the Cold War that condemned Russia to a marginal role in the European security architecture, instead of integrating it - not only economically but also politically and in the field of security - into a common project that covers the whole continent. At that point, the European Union did not yet exist, nor therefore the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the European Communities lacked decision-making instruments or capacity to design a new paradigm for European security, beyond decisions made in Washington. It is difficult to know if this “common home” that Russia requested on several occasions would have worked or if this was simply Moscow playing for time to recover from the collapse of the Soviet Union, but it is true that the scheme was not attempted, beyond the unequal NATO-Russia Council that was not, of course, Moscow’s objective. The second mistake was NATO’s declared intention to let Ukraine and Georgia become members, as approved in the Bucharest summit in 2008, although no date was set. All the allied foreign ministries knew that Ukraine could be a “casus belli” for Russia, for historical, geopo- litical and political reasons, including the matter of the minorities, but no attempt was made to negotiate neu- trality with Russia that might be an appropriate solution for a country with diverse historical origins and which will