THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

87 (Bulgaria, Croatia et al., 2022). Moreover, in light of the results of the elections of September 2022 (Swedish Elec- tion Authority, 2022), we cannot ignore the fact that the new Swedish government which will hold the Presidency will either include or be supported by the far right and is thus unlikely to be strongly in favour of integration. The leadership of a large, pro-European state The responsibility, then, falls to Spain, a country of suffi- cient size and influence, with a pro-European tradition, and the opportunity to establish alliances with other Member states and with institutions to lead change. Spain is the EU’s fourth-largest Member state in terms of population, the second in size, and the fourth-largest economy in the EU and the Eurozone. This means it has significant weight in terms of power and representation. Moreover, it is a member of all the integration areas, making it part of the EU’s core. After Brexit, there were calls for Spain to fill the vacuum in political leadership vacated by the United Kingdom, one that Italy was un- able to fill due to its own political instability. However, this expectation was not fully realized. Since it joined in 1986, Spain has been a pro-Euro- pean Member state, with its political parties and public opinion traditionally supporting the federal political pro- ject of European integration (Fernández Pasarín and Mo- rata, 2020). This position, however, has begun to change in recent years with the appearance of a political party, Vox, which declares itself to be openly intergovernmental when not overtly Europhobic (Vox, 2018). Spanish public opinion has also shifted, with support for more integra- tionist approaches falling in the wake of the 2008 crisis, although recently this trend has begun to reverse. As a Member state, Spain has experienced two very different stages in its role within the EU (Guinea Llorente, 2019). The first, from its entry until 2004, and coincid- ing with the governments of Felipe González and José María Aznar, was characterised by a firm desire to lead the European project, and this was given expression in the various Spanish Presidencies. However, these govern- ments promoted two distinct models for the EU: a federal model favoured by González and an intergovernmental one favoured by Aznar. These two sub-stages were also characterised by Spain’s participation in solid, stable co- alitions to lead the project. Under González, with France and Germany; and under Aznar, with the United Kingdom and Portugal. In both cases, however, there was a strate- gic political project and the determination to put Spain at the centre of the EU, making it an indispensable partner in any European negotiations and consensus, using all the resources at its disposal. Since 2004, however, the country’s political profile has diminished, when Spain ceased to aspire to lead an overall political project and instead limited itself to negotiating specific issues, focusing on the immediate context and defending its national interests. Nor did it form part of stable coalitions. Since 2004, a lack of either a strategic focus or proactivity have restricted Spain to negotiating the different dossiers it has been responsible for at any given time, without making radical propos- als or advocating a change of model. There has been a shift, then, from a strategic policy to a tactical approach. Spain’s negotiating capacity, however, continues to re- flect its power, with notable successes in issues it deems to be of vital importance, such as the negotiations over the Spanish rescue (Guinea Llorente, 2017: 546–547), the various budget negotiations or, more recently, those regarding the Next Generation programme. We would like Spain to return to a strategic policy, to the ambition of shaping the future of the EU, to once again being a central state. The European political cycle accompanies the Presidency and demands proactivity Spain will lead the EU in the six-month period prior to the elections to the European Parliament in May 2024. The legislative agenda means that Spain will be responsible for mediating the conclusion by the Council of many of