THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION. Reforming Europe in a time of war

The European Union on the global stage. European strategic autonomy 95 reality.These wars, and the realisation, that the Europeans were unable to deal with such crises in their imminent neighbourhood without the United States and NATO, were the main catalysts for bringing the dimension of foreign and security policy into the European integration process. Without even being mentioned, the first defini- tion of Strategic Autonomy, which is still of value today, can be found in the declarations of the EU Council on Cologne 1999: “The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forc- es, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO” (EU Council 1999). This was the starting point for a rapid succession of institu- tion-building and goal-setting for the European Union. The results were, in loose order, the post of the High Rep- resentative for Foreign and Security Policy, The European External Action Service, various strategies for foreign and security policy, as well as ambitious goals for European capabilities.The latter started with the rather high-aiming Helsinki Headline Goals 1999 of being able to deploy around 50 – 60.000 troops in 60 days and keep this engagement for a year. Since this was difficult to achieve, in 2004 the EU created the Battle Groups, smaller units of 1500 personnel to be deployed within days, a concept, that was ready by 2007. However, the Battle Groups have never been deployed, due to “…issues relating to political will, usability, and financial solidarity…” (EEAS 2019). The above-mentioned selective examples of the EU’s action in security policy show, there is a pattern in this field: The institutional framework is built up with consid- erable speed and diligence, the capabilities, to be provid- ed by the member states lacks behind, and political will seems rather scarce. The preconditions for a more clearly defined political direction, such as mutual trust between the member states as well as a sense of shared destiny, were never really fulfilled. Both clashed mostly with the different perceptions of the relationship with NATO and the United States on the one hand and the question of how to deal with Russia on the other hand (Mauro 2021: 5, Retter et al 2021: 3)).That hasn’t prevented the EU from implementing a series of missions in its neighbourhood as well as especially in Africa (for a full overview of EU missions, see EEAS 2021). However, despite the aim for “a stable world and a safer Europe” (EEAS 2021), one cannot overlook the fact, that the world at large, but especially the European neighbourhood has become more and more un- stable during the build-up of a more autonomous Europe. The wars in Georgia, Ukraine,Armenia andAzerbaijan, the ongoing conflict in Syria with active participation of Russia and Turkey, as well as the conflict zones in the Middle East and below the Sahel bear witness of this worsening of the situation. Even before the Russian war against Ukraine, this would have been important drivers for an intensified effort towards European strategic autonomy. Another political driver for these efforts were the United States themselves. Already under President Oba- ma, the focus of Washington shifted towards the Pacific, nudging for a more assertive and stronger role of Europe on its own continent. During the presidency of Donald J. Trump in the United States, the pressure piled up consid- erably. His contempt towards the European Union, dis- regard of NATO, and more generally rather transactional approach to foreign policy, reminded Europeans of the fragility of their reliance onWashington (Kaminski 2022, Grevi 2021: 15). But even under Joe Biden, the US-pres- ident with a strong transatlantic orientation, there came this awkward moment, where Europeans were made clear, how much they were dependent on the interests and decision-making processes in Washington. During the chaotic evacuation from Afghanistan, the coordina- tion between allies was more than sub-optimal. Whereas the realities seem to push for more Europe in security policy, the sovereigns in Europe, meaning the electorate, is more reluctant. Popular opinion is rather divided on the question of strategic autonomy. Even be- fore the war, most citizens included in a poll on security policy in Europe were rather in favour of an intensified cooperation between NATO and EU. The idea of a more autonomous role of the EU from NATO garnered only marginal support (Katsioulis et al 2022: 29). Even in Italy, the most supportive country included in the poll, only