THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

THE MEMBER STATES HAVE TO MAKE SOME FAR-REACHING DECISIONS: WHAT CAN A COMMON EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY LOOK LIKE IN THE CLIMATE-NEUTRAL AGE? 103 In addition, a raw materials agency has been estab- lished with branches in various mining countries. Fur- thermore, the activities of all ministries related to raw material procurement and recycling are coordinated. The companies themselves invest in the entire value chain and are also active in mining, for example. They receive extensive support from the raw materials agency Jogmec. High-risk investments in raw materials are fi- nancially supported. The Global South: better offers and fewer appeals, please In an increasingly hostile geopolitical and geo-economic world, Europeans must carefully balance their strategic goals of security of supply, climate protection and com- petitiveness. Access to raw materials and energy imports plays a key role, as already described. Otherwise, there will be a threat to both economic prosperity and social peace. And the climate transition cannot be managed without them. The proverbial elephant in the room is Chi- na.Whether in Africa or Latin America, wherever theWest goes in search of much-needed raw materials, China is already there. And China is here to stay. Other emerg- ing economies are also reactivating or deepening their relations with the countries of the Global South. They are competitors in the race for the vital raw materials without which neither the energy transition nor digitalisation can be managed. Without supplies of raw materials and en- ergy, it will be very difficult for the industrialised countries to maintain their industrial base and keep up with the development of competitive new industries. The countries of the Global South have no interest in taking sides in the growing geopolitical polarisation. This attitude stems from their own convictions as well as their own interests. This may be disappointing from a European perspective, as was the case with the reac- tions to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the neutral stance of emerging and developing countries certainly pays off for them. If various potential trading partners are available, the best offer can be chosen. And here, not only the price is likely to play a role, but also the of- fers to build up their own local industries and to transfer technology. A number of new partnerships in the energy sector are currently being sought and promised. Here, Europe must actually deliver and serve not only its own pressing interests but also those of its trading partners, especially since its competitors are also adjusting to the changing situation. China, for example, formerly had the reputa- tion of only being interested in raw materials and agri- cultural products that were exported in their raw state to the People’s Republic to be processed there, but the country is now responding to the wishes of its trading partners. The construction of a joint lithium-ion battery factory with a domestic company in Chile may provide a foretaste of what is to come. For the Europeans, it is also important to honestly weigh up interests and be realistic about room for ma- noeuvre while developing a clear strategy in this field. Europe will have to practise a difficult balancing act in the future. On the one hand, it wants to meet its own high social and ecological standards in other parts of the world and thus promote its own values in the geo- strategic race. At the same time, Europeans can no long- er seek to dictate to other countries how they should act if they wish to avoid accusations of neocolonialism. This often involves balancing an apparent ambiva- lence. The interests of local communities around the extraction sites of sought-after raw materials are often different from those of their national governments. The former struggle with the negative impacts of resource extraction on health and livelihoods; the latter see the positive effects on national budgets and foreign ex- change reserves. Ambitious social and environmental standards often have a reputation in the Global South as protectionism in disguise. Concluding the desired trade agreements and at the same time satisfying the EU’s ecological and social demands is by no means a foregone conclusion. European Green Deal 2.0 under challenging conditions The priorities of the next Commission are likely to in- clude industrial policy as well as clean tech funding. This is even more likely in view of the failed efforts to establish an EU Sovereignty Fund in July 2023. Great-