THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 50 Although “the diagnosis and the prescriptions are clear, there has been a lack of political will” (Borrell 2023a: 163). In 2023, it is worth asking how the return of the spectre of war to the European continent has affected the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the achievement of the genuine stra- tegic autonomy that was established as an EU objective (EEAS 2016). At present, the arguments run in two op- posing directions. On the one hand, it can be argued that the war and the existential threat posed by Putin’s policy towards the EU are a stark reminder to Member states of the need to share sovereignty in defence and to construct a genuine common security and defence policy worthy of the name (Raik, Blockmans et al. 2023:37). On the other hand, there is the view that the war once again demonstrates that NATO is indispensable to the defence of the European continent and that it is not, therefore, a driver of the development of the CSDP (Pirozzi 2023:2). Once again, we find ourselves facing the eternal dilemma that confronts Member states with regard to European integration: sovereignty vs. effective- ness. In Monnet’s view, the solution to this dilemma was that Europe would be formed in periods of crisis, and that it would be the sum of the solutions we developed in response to these crises (Monnet 1976: 488). In this chapter, we will analyse the political develop- ments that have occurred in the course of the sixteen months of war in an attempt to answer, in so far as is pos- sible, the question of whether the Ukraine crisis has had the effect of strengthening the EU’s defence policy. We will begin by providing a brief overview of the CSDP and the existing cooperation in defence issues between Mem- ber states, to identify the starting point and the condi- tioning factors. In the second section, we will address the concept of strategic autonomy with respect to defence, as proposed since 2016, and we will consider what progress has been made. In the third section, we will analyse de- velopments over the last year, both in terms of the strate- gic documents that have been approved – the Versailles Declaration and the Strategic Compass – and the action taken, so that we consider not just statements of intent but also outcomes as we assess whether there has been a paradigm shift. We will end with the conclusions and some recommendations for action. The Common Security and Defence Policy: coordination in the hands of Member states The European integration project was born with a spe- cific ideological DNA, based on the Kantian idea that, by promoting “commerce between different peoples (…) [I]n this way the peoples would be at first brought into peaceful relation with one another (…) even with their most distant neighbours.” (Kant 2011: 81). It starts from the assumption that it is possible to abolish war by gen- erating interdependencies – and thus shared interests – between states. As a result, Maastricht did not see hard power as one of the tools the EU needed to have its dis- posal in order to become an international player. As one observer noted, “the EU was not created to wage war.” Ever since its creation, the EU has co-existed with NATO, an organization in which the majority of EU Member states participate, and one that has provided the means by which the United States has acted as the guarantor of European security 1 . This has meant that Europeans have been able to allocate their resources primarily to social and welfare policies, and have grown unaccustomed to the need to invest in defence (Cottey 2013:11). This explains why security and defence were only belatedly included in European integration, after 2003.And it also reflects the reality, a source of constant recrimination by the United States that Member states do not invest enough in their defensive capabilities, 2 that they do so in a fragmentary manner 3 and that it is the first sector to be cut when they are hit by economic crisis. 4 1 As of 30 June 2023, the EU and NATO shared 22 Member states, pending the ratification of Sweden’s application for membership by Turkey and Hungary, which would increase the total to 23. There are four neutral or non-aligned EU states which are not members of NATO: Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta. When Sweden is admitted, 96.5% of the European population will be covered by NATO’s guarantees. 2 On aggregate, the Member states allocated just 1.5% of their GDP to defence, a long way short of the figure of 2% established as a threshold by NATO (European Commission 2022: 1). 3 Although the Member states themselves had proposed allocating 35% of their defence spending to collaborative projects with other Member states, in 2021 this figure was only 11% (European Commission 2022: 1). 4 So, for example, the financial crisis which began in 2008 had a global effect of cuts to the defence budgets of the 27 Member states, reducing them by 12% by 2014. These budgets did not return to the 2007 pre- crisis levels until 2018. Meanwhile, powers such as Russia and China multiplied their expenditure by a factor of 3 or 4 (EDA 2021:4).