THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 52 commitments, or from deciding to enter into bilateral or multilateral cooperation in defence matters with other Member states. The war has changed the Danish posi- tion, as we will see below. Strategic autonomy linked to defence: a (traditionally) controversial issue The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, in- troduced innovations to implement a defence policy, in addition to the existing security policy, but these were not applied in the years that followed. It would not be until 2016, a year which marked a turning point in Eu- ropean policy, that the European Council would make defence one of its priorities with the adoption of the objective of strategic autonomy. This new objective was set out in the Global Strategy for the Foreign and Secu- rity Policy of the European Union (EEAS 2016: 4) and developed by the Bratislava Roadmap (Heads of State and Government 2016:5). Strategic autonomy is de- fined as “the capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible” (Council of the EU 2016). We can ask what happened in 2016 to change the mentality and willingness of Member states. The inter- national environment was becoming more unstable, and the demand for security was thus growing. Conflict and instability in the European neighbourhood were spread- ing, both in the east, following the first Ukraine war, and in the Mediterranean, with the various conflicts that arose out of the Arab Spring. Global politics had also become more bad-tempered and less cooperative, with the growing assertiveness of the emerging powers. And, finally, Trump’s election to the White House raised doubts as to whether NATO could continue to act as a guarantor of European security. Within the EU itself there were other dynamics fa- vouring the development of a defence policy: a signifi- cant change in European public opinion caused by the international situation, a much more political European Commission led by Juncker, who did not hesitate to as- sume a new role with a creative interpretation of the treaties, and the window of opportunity created by Brexit. The United Kingdom’s departure had a triple ef- fect: it created a shortfall of capabilities, as the British army was the most powerful in the EU; that country’s traditional veto of the development of a distinctively European defence policy disappeared; and European leaders felt obliged to signal their commitment to the political future of the EU, in which defence was a power- ful symbol (Guinea 2021: 166). The European Defence Union, established between 2016 and 2017, is based on three pillars, described as “thinking, purchasing and acting together” (Tocci 2018: 135-137). The first step was taken in November 2016, when the European Commission drew up the European Defence Action Plan (European Commission 2016). This document assessed the existing security and defence deficits, established the objective of promoting efficien- cy in the military spending of Member states, sought to promote cooperation between Member states through financial incentives in the research and development of capabilities, and also emphasised the need to strength- en the competitiveness and innovation of the industrial base. As a result of this Action Plan, in 2018 the Euro- pean Defence Industrial Development Programme was created, designed to strengthen research and develop- ment in military issues, supporting collaborative efforts both by Member states and by specific industries (Regu- lation (EU) 2018/1092). It sought to address one of the important deficits of European defence, namely the lack of public investment in critical technologies and the con- sequent shortfall in innovation when compared to other regions of the world. As a consequence of this, it was decided to implement a pilot project using the EU budget to fund collaborative defence research efforts. This would be the Preparatory Action on Defence Research, designed to provide a lim- ited test of some elements of a future European Defence Fund (European Commission 2023a). The Preparatory Action was applied during the two-year period 2017 to 2019, with a budget of 90 million euros. Under this ini- tiative, 18 collaborative research projects were funded, selected through three separate calls for tender. The Court of Auditors has recently presented the report evaluating this preparatory initiative (Court of Auditors 2023). This argues that it was only of limited effectiveness as a test process. With respect to the sub- ject under discussion here – verifying the effectiveness