THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE: IS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY A GENUINELY SHARED AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 53 of the programme through the involvement of Member states – it finds that the success of the tender process was uneven with respect both to Member states and industries, with some in which scarcely any consortia participated. Participation was clearly concentrated in large Member states in western Europe with strong defence industries. France was a long way ahead both in the coordination of projects and in the numbers of public and private bodies taking party, followed at some distance by Italy and, a long way behind, by Germany and Spain. Eastern European and Nordic states did not lead any projects, while organizations from those countries participated in very few projects, suggesting little interest in joint defence investments. Indeed, the report identified a degree of resentment from this group of Member states towards a project which is led by the Franco-German axis and is perceived as exclusively pro- moting its interests. In 2021, the European Defence Fund (EDF) was established on a permanent basis, within the existing Multiannual Financial Framework, with the aim of co- funding collaborative research and development projects between several Member states, and the joint purchase of defence equipment (Regulation (EU) 2021/697). Its objectives are to address deficits in the area of capa- bilities, to invest in research, to strengthen the industry at the European scale, and to generate inter-operability between the military capabilities of Member states. It received significant funding, totalling 7,953 million eu- ros. Based on the legal provisions of the EU’s industrial policy, the EDF broke two taboos: the prohibition on funding military spending through the EU budget, and the significant influence of the Commission, through its approval of calls for tender. The EDF does not alter the model of the existing CSDP, in so far as co-funded pro- jects or the capabilities acquired will ultimately belong to the participating Member states or companies, who will in the last instance decide how they are to be used. The Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) was established in 2017 to identify the defence capa- bilities of Member states and enable coordinated ac- tion. This process, conducted by the European Defence Agency (EDA), conducts a year-long evaluation of the European defence situation, analysing information from national defence plans from the perspective of the de- velopment of European capabilities (EDA 2023). It aims to offer a diagnosis of joint needs, so that the instru- ments at the disposal of the EU (EDF, PESCO etc.) can be used to support collaborative projects between public and private organisations in Member states to address these limitations. Its long-term objective is to gradually align the planning and development of national capa- bilities, seeking the complementarity and Europeanisa- tion of national defence policies. At the same time, in December 2017, the Council approved the application of twenty-five Member states to activate Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), to take on more binding commitments in relation to defence, and to launch collaborative projects between groups of Member states to develop both military and institutional capabilities (Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315). PESCO represents a major political innovation, in so far as it envisages flexibility so that Member states can decide which projects they wish to cooperate on and where they want to commit their resources, depending on their specific philosophies and interests. For exam- ple, neutral states might decide to participate in secu- rity projects. PESCO also represents the consolidation of an intergovernmental policy which imposes certain limitations on sovereignty, as the participants enter into legally binding commitments; the results are subject to evaluation; within the project, decisions are taken by qualified majority; and there is the possibility of sanc- tioning non-compliant states with expulsion. Following its recent referendum on defence, Denmark will join PESCO in May 2023, making Malta the only Member state not to participate (Decision (CFSP) 2023/1015). At the time of writing, a total of 72 projects have been approved, with three closed at the decision of members (Decision (CFSP) 2023/995). These projects are very varied, ranging from the development of spe- cific military equipment and munitions to the configu- ration of logistical or institutional structures to support operations, platforms for cooperation between Mem- ber states, and training structures. If we analyse all of these, it is clear that PESCO is currently pursuing four distinct objectives: reducing the number of existing ar- mament systems; strengthening operational coopera- tion between Member states; using inter-operability to connect troops; and boosting industrial competitiveness