THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE: IS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY A GENUINELY SHARED AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 55 mandate, he has emphasised the objective of taking the necessary steps to ensure the EU’s capacity for collective action (Borrell 2023a: 151). He argues that the principal causes of the failure of the objectives presented by the CSDP and low national commitment have been the dif- fering visions of what the CSDP should be, divergent strategic cultures and interests between Member states, and mutual suspicion. To address this, he proposes working to formulate a comprehensive approach to the CSDP, one that is agreed between governments and is designed to operate as an “action guide” to be imple- mented over the coming years. This is the Strategic Com- pass which, although it was approved after the start of the Ukraine war, reflected this earlier logic (Council of the EU 2022). Its aim was to promote a shared strategic culture and a list of objectives to which Member states are com- mitted, and to close the gap between expectations and results. It sought to achieve the first aim through the drafting process, with a first draft drawn up by experts and final wording agreed upon by Member states so that they would have ownership of the plan. The second objective was to be achieved by establishing deadlines for achieving milestones, and a “robust” monitoring and evaluation plan. The Russian invasion of Ukraine gave new meaning and purpose to this initial intention, and led to minor revisions of the document at the last moment. Defence and strategic autonomy after the return of war to Europe. A turning point? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 had a brutal impact on the course of European integration, contributing to the development of the EU as a geopoliti- cal actor (Guinea 2022). It affected how its policies were conceived, contributing to a more Hobbesian vision of the world and international relations. With respect to the politics of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), it led to more supranational dynamics. And it contributed towards a reconsideration of those policies, with an emphasis on conflict and a weaponisation of economic and social instruments. Finally, it triggered the formulation of the whole political strategy, establishing the objective of strategic autonomy as a cross-cutting vector of all European political action. And, on this new global political agenda, defence will take a prime posi- tion in the decision to assume our responsibilities and our security and to construct a “European sovereignty” (Heads of State and Government 2022: 3). With respect to the CSDP, the war has influenced the European security context in a number of ways, leading to new calls for the development of a Defence Union. It radically changes both the international and the Euro- pean security context, demonstrating that the norma- tive framework of the post-Cold War period is no longer viable, that there is a real possibility that EU states could be the victims of aggression and that, given their capabilities, it is better for them to protect themselves together than to do so separately. At the same time, it also lays bare the current vulnerability of the EU, which has a significant deficit in hard power capabilities and is structurally dependent on the United States for its de- fence, through NATO. Thirdly, Ukraine is also an example of the hybrid forms of modern conflict, and raises the need to address other dimensions of defence, such as the cybersphere, the maritime sphere, and space. Similarly, the fact that Ukraine has been a partner of the EU since 2014 has meant that it has been supported in every way possible, and has meant the country has de facto been included in the EU security space, which obliges the EU to provide political and military support both within the framework of the conflict and over the longer term (Biscop 2023). Member states’ concrete military support for Ukraine, supplying arms and mu- nitions, raises the need to replenish national stocks of military equipment, permitting the modernisation and Europeanisation of national military capabilities. Finally, the reorganisation of NATO and the New NATO Force Model represents an opportunity for greater coopera- tion between Member states, strengthening inter-opera- bility, which could also indirectly affect the CSDP (Biscop 2023). Recognition of the new geopolitical situation has also led to radical changes to the positions of Member states with respect to their own defence policies. In the first place, it is important to note the decision of Sweden and Finland to join NATO, renouncing decades of posi- tioning themselves as civil powers. Finland is already a