THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 56 member of the Atlantic Alliance, and Sweden hopes that tensions with Turkey can be resolved and its member- ship will be ratified by the Turkish and Hungarian parlia- ments. Similarly, on 1 June 2022, Denmark held a ref- erendum to consult its citizens about its membership of the CSDP, renouncing its Maastricht opt-out. The result, supported by 67% of voters (Schaart 2022), came down in favour of CSDP membership. Even Ireland, which also has a formal opt-out, is an increasingly active partici- pant in common defence initiatives. 7 The conflict has also had an impact on public support for a common European defence policy. This support was already high and widespread (found in all Member states). However, the Eurobarometer taken just a year after the invasion found that 77% of respondents were in favour of a common security and defence policy, 80% supported the idea that the procurement of military equipment between Member states should be better coordinated, and 69% agreed that the EU needed to strengthen its production of military equipment (Stand- ard Eurobarometer 2023). In parallel, all Member states have significantly boosted their spending on defence, as a result of the war, with the result that Europe – with a rise of 13% – is the region increasing its military budget by the greatest amount over the past year (SIPRI 2023:1). This shows that Member states have embarked upon the long and difficult process of strengthening their national defence capabilities, which is essential if Europe is to improve its ability to safeguard its own security (Raik, Blockmans et al. 20 23: 32). Furthermore, European countries have announced that they will significantly expand their military expendi- ture over the next 5 to 10 years, reflecting the multi- annual projects they have initiated (SIPRI 2023:5). This shows that the aim is not just to spend more but to spend better on cooperative projects which strengthen joint defence. An example of this shift is Germany, which has expressly stipulated that this strengthening of na- tional defence is designed to safeguard Europe’s territo- rial integrity (Scholz 2023:24). It is clear, then, that the 7 This country participates in the EDA and PESCO, despite its opt-out. And it also responded to France’s activation of art. 42.7 in 2015, re- questing assistance in its fight against international terrorism. war and the existence of a shared enemy have created a political will which did not previously exist. All of this led the EU to adopt, just three weeks af- ter the start of the war, its ambitious Versailles Agenda, in which it set out the objective of strategic autonomy in three specific areas of vulnerability exposed by the conflict: defence, energy and the economy (Heads of State and Government 2022). With regard to defence, it proposes a series of objectives: a) to substantially in- crease expenditure on defence, dedicating a significant portion to investment, focusing on strategic weaknesses detected, and developing defence capabilities on a col- laborative basis; b) to create new incentives to stimulate collaborative investment by Member states in joint pro- jects, and the joint acquisition of new defence capabili- ties; c) to increase investment in the capabilities needed to implement the full range of missions and operations, in particular strategic support elements such as cyberse- curity and spatial connectivity; d) to promote synergies between civil, defence and spatial research and innova- tion, and to invest in critical and emerging technolo- gies, and in innovation for security and defence; e) to adopt measures to strengthen and develop the defence industry, including small and medium-sized enterprises; f) to protect against the intensification of hybrid war, strengthening cyber-resilience, the protection of infra- structures, and combating disinformation; g) to improve the security and defence dimension of space industries and activities; h) to speed up work on military mobility throughout the EU. Detailed analysis of the Versailles mandate shows there are no major innovations in terms of the model but, rather, an emphasis on constructing and consolidat- ing the main elements designed to strengthen the CSDP with new commitments. All of this reflects the demands of the changing environment as demonstrated by the war, as noted above. In this respect, the format of this summit is important. It is not a European Council but a meeting of EU Heads of State and Government, in- dicating that they are acting beyond the competencies of the EU and undertake to address a series of shared challenges as a joint entity. The added value of Versailles is an increased political will, caused by the war, which states that it is conceived as a plan of action, providing for regular review of its status by the European Council.