THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE: IS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY A GENUINELY SHARED AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 57 If one also takes note of the increased military spending by almost all Member states, the political message is the commitment of national leaders not only to spend more on military and security equipment but also to spend jointly on shared projects to ensure inter-operability and the common defence of the EU. The Versailles Agenda has to be read in conjunction with the Strategic Compass, which was approved by the Council just two weeks later (Council of the EU 2022). We have seen that it reflects a different logic, one that predates the war, but the objectives are compatible. The Compass, in addition to providing a shared diagnosis of risks and threats, also includes an action plan, to be implemented by 2030, with a set of objectives and measures which provide an overview of security and defence, divided into four pillars. The first pillar, “Act”, seeks to strengthen the EU response to crises, proposing four major objectives: to improve crisis management, with a focus on missions, decision-making and fund- ing, and promoting greater cohesion; develop a Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops; to generate its own capabilities for civil management of crisis; and to strengthen command and control structures, military mobility and joint exercises. The second pillar, “Secure”, seeks to improve resilience by strengthening the abil- ity to anticipate in order to ensure a safe environment. Its objectives are: to boost intelligence capacities; to develop hybrid tool boxes to respond to threats of this kind, with particular emphasis on disinformation; and to strengthen the cyber, maritime security and space di- mensions. The third pillar, “Invest”, is where there is the greatest overlap with the Versailles Agenda The aim is to spend more and better to improve operational capabili- ties: to develop cutting-edge capabilities; to use PESCO and the EDF to develop critical capabilities on a coop- erative basis; and to invest in innovation. The fourth and final pillar, “Partner”, seeks to strengthen strategic co- operation with NATO, the UN and other regional organi- sations; to develop bilateral partnerships with countries with similar values and principles; and to promote a Se- curity and Defence Partnership Forum with all partners. A number of observations can be made with respect to the Compass. Firstly, although there are elements spe- cific to defence, it takes a broad view of security. It does not appear to offer any great innovations with respect to CSDP, as there are many elements which were already being addressed. In other words, it is not an isolated commitment but instead integrates perfectly with the whole CSDP development and is fully compatible with the Versailles Agenda. The innovations can be significant, above all, those aimed at the EU’s own capabilities and their use, such as the Rapid Deployment Capability or improvement of institutional structures, such as intel- ligence or command and control. However, its added value derives from the fact that it does not simply switch to another model but instead seeks to effectively com- mit all Member states to its implementation. And this is where evaluation of its implementation will be key. At the same time, we must continue to stress that, although it alludes on several occasions to the “solidarity and mu- tual assistance” provided for in article 42.7 (Council of the EU 2022:2), it does not address either the normative development or operationality of such assistance, and nor does it tackle the challenge of the territorial defence of the EU, a matter which remains the remit of NATO. Actions during the first year of a common response to war: a paradigm shift The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led Member states to change their national defence policies. The new stra- tegic agenda also seems to display a clear political will to develop a common policy at the heart of the EU to increasingly delegate to this organisation “the defence of its citizens and of the Union” (Council of the EU 2022:5). However, in its efforts to construct a common defence, we have repeatedly confirmed the existence of the “capabilities-expectations gap” (Hill 1993). On the one hand, there is a raft of documents and declarations setting out objectives, and on the other there is a lack of effective implementation, due to a lack of political will and commitment on the part of Member states. Here, we will evaluate the developments of the last sixteen months and ask whether the war has had a significant impact on Member states and whether, in fact, they are working towards achieving the Versailles and Strategic Compass objectives. The first question is whether use by the EU of in- struments of the CSDP to support Ukraine militarily