THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE: IS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY A GENUINELY SHARED AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 59 private companies, many of them SMEs, and these will only make major investments to strengthen their manu- facturing capacity if sustained demand is guaranteed. There is also a need to evaluate progress in devel- oping the Versailles objectives, sixteen months later. As a consequence of the mandate of the Heads of State and Government, the Commission together with the EDA conducted an analysis of the defence capabilities of Member states and an action plan for coordinated national investment (European Commission/AR 2022). Starting with an evaluation of the principal weakness- es of the military capacities of Member states, it pro- poses that the defence spending of Member states be increased in a coordinated fashion, creating a far more solid technological and industrial base for the EU’s de- fence, and increased conventional deterrence for every kind of potential adversary (European Commission/AR 2022:1). The aim, then, is for this increased funding to be spent “jointly” on collaborative projects, “better”, in accordance with the priorities already agreed by Member states and set out in the Strategic Compass, and “with a European perspective”, that is, “buying European” to promote a powerful common defence industry capable of guaranteeing strategic autonomy in the long term. To achieve these objectives, the Commission and the High Representative have already created a Work- ing Group on Joint Procurement to coordinate the purchase of defence equipment with Member states, with the major long-term aim being that the strategic planning and procurement of military equipment by Member states be conducted in concert. This objective encapsulates a broader ambition when we consider the symbiosis in many Member states between their Minis- tries of Defence and their national arms industries. Here, it is possible to detect what could become a paradigm shift, although it is one that exists at the level of vision rather than of action. The Commission’s Communication stresses the possibility of adapting European legislation to incentivise the joint procurement of military equip- ment and thus strengthen the European defence indus- try, and to implement a European Defence Investment Programme to support the implementation of develop- ment projects which are beyond the capacity of indi- vidual Member states. To develop this objective of promoting joint procure- ment, in July 2022 the Commission presented the Eu- ropean Defence Industry Reinforcement through Com- mon Procurement Act (EDIRPA) (European Commission 2022). This creates an instrument backed by 500 million euros to fund the joint procurement of defence equip- ment by three or more Member states. It supports vari- ous objectives: to encourage Member states to work together, to improve the efficiency of defence spend- ing, to support the replacement of stocks transferred to Ukraine, to promote the inter-operability of European armies, and to strengthen the European defence in- dustry. This instrument is designed to be implemented in coordination with the Working Group on Common Procurement. On 28 June 2023 a political agreement was reached between the parliament and the Council, finally breaking the deadlock concerning the origin of the industrial suppliers (Council of the EU 2023). It was agreed that they must be based in the EU or the states of the European Economic Area, with clear requirements to ensure that no third party state can impose limits on their use. This criterion serves to protect the strategic autonomy of the EU. It is also important to evaluate progress with imple- mentation of the Strategic Compass. The High Repre- sentative presented a report identifying the activities undertaken during the first year of the Compass in each of the four pillars (Borrell 2023b). The ambitious response to the Ukraine conflict, and the implementa- tion of two new crisis management missions in Armenia and Niger are particularly noteworthy. The report also describes the preparatory work for the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, with the intention that this will be operational for 2025, and the consolidation of the Military Planning and Conduct Capability, the European HQ, to enable it to plan and direct joint operations and exercises. A first EU joint exercise has been planned for October 2023, with the objective of testing the inter- operability of European forces. In the objective “Secure”, it is worth noting the re- inforcement of civil crisis management capabilities, the new Military Mobility Action Plan and the development of protocols, operational coordination and joint exer- cises in the cyber, hybrid, spatial and maritime scenarios. The “Invest” section identifies the increase in spending