THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 60 by Member states, the need to coordinate and invest together, and all the initiatives that derive from Ver- sailles, along with the decision to update the Capability Development Plan and to develop a European Defence Investment Programme. The “Partner” section sets out the close collaboration with NATO and the approval of a new joint agenda, with the United Nations, the Afri- can Union, and the special relationship with the United States and other partners. In this regard, the first Schu- man Forum was held in March 2023, to provide a space for dialogue with partners who share our values and objectives as to how to tackle the existing challenges in security and defence. The Report concludes by arguing that there has been significant, concrete progress, and that the gap between our aspirations and our actions is narrowing, making Hill’s thesis a thing of the past (Borrell 2023b:22). The brutal context of the war has changed the perceptions and commitment of Member states, driving a paradigm shift and giving institutions a clear mandate to develop a common defence. And this institutional development appears to be backed by the desire of Member states to participate in all these common initiatives. We can also ask whether, in this year of war, the relationship between the EU and NATO has been af- fected in any way. This is a very important question, given that in the past the loyalty of some Member states to the Atlantic alliance hindered the develop- ment of the CSDP. The war, in this respect, has acted as a unifying element. As Katsoulis argues, the permanent friction between the EU and NATO has abated, at least for the medium term (2022: 103). The need to ensure effective management of the conflict has led to ongo- ing and fluid cooperation between the two organiza- tions. This is exemplified by the way that the Council has regularly invited the Secretary General of NATO, Stoltenberg, to meetings of Ministers of Defence in order to maintain dialogue between the two organisa- tions (Foreign Affairs Council 2023), that representa- tives of European institutions have participated in the NATO summit and the High Representative, Borrell, has also been invited to meetings of the Atlantic Council. A pragmatic approach has been applied, recognising the complementarity between the two organisations, and the importance of cooperation to construct security in Europe, as shown by the third Declaration of Coopera- tion approved in January 2023. The war in Ukraine has also had an unexpected ef- fect: the coordination of political action between the United Kingdom and the EU, which have realigned to offer a common response to a shared threat (Whitman 2023). This is particularly noteworthy given the fact that conflicts in British internal politics led to the exclusion of any commitment in the area of security and defence from the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation. With respect to diplomatic and military support for Ukraine and the application of sanctions to Russia, the United Kingdom and the EU have coordinated their positions, and this desire to work together to guarantee European security is also seen in the willingness of the United Kingdom to join the European Political Community. Conclusions In our analysis, we have seen how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has acted as a powerful catalyst in the de- velopment of the CSDP, generating significant changes. Firstly, military support for Ukraine means that the EU can no longer be classified as a civil power: the Rubicon has been crossed. And some of the assistance measures have a fundamental if indirect impact on common de- fence. For example, the decision to use the EPF to fund the despatch of military equipment to Ukraine is leading to the de facto modernisation and improvement of the military capabilities of Member states. The three-step approach to rapidly provide Ukraine with ammunition has led to the establishment of joint procurement and investment in the manufacturing capabilities of the European defence industry. However, it is logical that companies will not commit to expensive efforts to ex- pand their business if they do not have a predictable procurement environment. This means that the next step must be to create incentives for Member states to pro- cure jointly on a stable basis from European companies, something that requires a commitment to joint planning by Member states and a capacity for innovation on the part of industry. War has strengthened the political will of Member states, articulated in 2016, to work to develop capabili-