THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Towards a new legislative term

EUROPEAN DEFENCE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE: IS STRATEGIC AUTONOMY A GENUINELY SHARED AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVE? 61 ties to enable the EU to safeguard European defence: in other words, strategic autonomy. And it appears to have allayed the suspicions of the Nordic states and those in eastern Europe regarding the excessive influence of the Franco-German axis. The most important effect is illus- trated by analysis of the progress produced in the first year of war, which demonstrates real commitment both in terms of outcomes and the determination to close the gap between promises and capabilities. However, this political will must be sustained over the long term, when the threat of war is no longer present, and in a very deli- cate context, one characterised by differences between Member states in terms of perceptions and interests, the enormous resources required, and the tricky relationship with NATO. Developments of the past year show that the exist- ing CSDP model – which is based on coordination and a cooperative approach to guarantee the inter-operability of national capabilities, common investment, support for innovation and for the European defence industry – has not been abandoned. Rather, it has been strengthened through joint procurement and direct investment to re- inforce European industrial capacity. While there is also a commitment to strengthening the capabilities of the EU itself in intelligence, operations direction etc., this remains low level. Despite the grandiloquent declara- tions of some leaders, there has been no move to create a European army. However, while the model may remain the same, there has been a paradigm shift, which consists in mov- ing beyond a purely intergovernmental approach and instead utilising all the advantages of common action. The European Commission, with the support of inter- governmental institutions – EDA and EEAS – has been charged with leading common policy; programmes and projects are covered by industrial legislation and ap- proved using legislative procedures such as Regulations; and the EU budget has been used to fund the different instruments. Member states have shown that they pri- oritise effectiveness over sovereignty. The reality is that defence has shifted from being an intergovernmental policy to become a shared EU policy. War has also delivered a lesson in realpolitik and humility. It has demonstrated that the capabilities that Europeans currently possess do not permit strategic au- tonomy and the defence of Europe. As Ayala argues, one of the lessons the EU must learn from the war is that it is “essential to create a Europe of Defence which makes it possible to guarantee, under normal conditions, the se- curity of Europeans against any aggression or coercion” (2022: 87). Although we have no choice but to continue to rely on NATO for collective deterrence and defence in recognition of our own weakness, in the longer term the commitment of the United States to Europe’s defence is not guaranteed, and it is thus important to continue to work to deliver strategic autonomy. Leaving aside the war in Ukraine, security threats in the international environment continue to grow. Taken individually, Member states are too small to confront these on their own. Protecting the security and interests of Europeans can only be done on a cooperative ba- sis. It is therefore time to leave behind the old dynamic of grandiose declarations and to continue, instead, to focus on results, consolidating the trends of the past year. The ball is in the court of Member states, who can freely choose which resources to allocate and whether or not to participate in collaborative projects under the umbrella of the EU. The war appears to have thrown up a new commitment to common action, but if this is to be successful then the impulse must be sustained over the decades to come. The dilemma is more pressing than ever: do we cling to old sovereignties or work together to create the capacity to act? Recommendations – Maintain military support for Ukraine for as long as necessary, given that our partner is a key component of European security. – Continue to work proactively on a consensus among all the Member States to design and build an inclu- sive CSDP that is responsive to the visions and in- terests of all and where the leaderships of particular Member States are not the object of suspicion. – Uphold the political will of Member States to con- tinue implementing the Versailles and Strategic Com- pass commitments as regards joint investment in capabilities and innovation, which means maintain- ing substantial defence spending after the conflict is