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Karim Hauser
the most important. Actors such as the Popular Mobilization Forces
(al-Hashd al-Shaabi)
,
sponsored by Baghdad and Tehran, or the Army of Islam (
Jaysh al-Islam
), funded by Saudi
Arabia, offer a case in point.
The balance of power on the ground is in constant turmoil. Fresh IS recruits come
from as far as Australia or France but also from closer grounds like Tunisia and Yemen.
Affiliates which now pledge allegiance to the Daesh flag have mushroomed in the area and
beyond: Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Nigeria, Kenya, Afghanistan. On the other side, the Kurds
seem to be constantly “skipping the rope”, negotiating their positions in Syria, Iraq and
in a more traumatic manner, with Turkey. The assertive role of Iran in this real “game of
thrones” is to be reckoned with, whilst the US and other Western actors appear more like
disoriented gamblers betting in a frenzied horserace.
Sectarianism, another subject explored in-depth by Casa Árabe and published in
its
bi-annual journal
Awraq
(No. 8, 2
nd
semester, 2013), has exponentially grown from
theological differences and geopolitical struggle to situations of fully-fledged religious war.
The
takfiris
, the so-called Muslims who follow a Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam
deeply impregnated in IS, easily accuse other Muslims (and other “people of the Book”)
of apostasy and obliterate lives accordingly. In addition, the role of media networks and
the propaganda machine that has been perfected by IS fans the flames by showing off its
bloody exploits like trophies.
Islamic State has found a fertile ground to expand its ideology in underdeveloped
areas such as Raqqah and Deir ez-Zor in Syria, but also in Iraqi provinces such as Mosul
or al-Anbar. Its draconian but pragmatic approach to achieve law and order seems to be
successful in some areas, in comparison to Baghdad’s previous dismal governance. For
instance, reports fromMosul indicate an improvement in services under IS rule: electricity
supply, food markets, distribution of oil derivatives have been re-established. It’s a strategy
of gaining legitimacy that is fear-induced but result-oriented.
At the same time, Shia militancy and its armed offshoots, which pre-dated the 2003 US-
led invasion, have multiplied over the last decade and flexed their muscles. Hezbollah in
Lebanon is a major player; in Iraq, the above-mentioned Popular Mobilization Forces, the
League of the Righteous
(Asaeb Ahlil Haq)
or even the now co-opted Badr Brigade, which
hardly receive any media attention, may be useful examples of this changing balance of
power. On June 13, 2014, Ayatollah al-Sistani issued a historic
fatwa
calling Iraqi citizens
to defend Iraq from IS. The “fatwalization” of public space is a well-established reality
on both sides, further complicated by the fact that Sunnis lack a proper hierarchy in the
issuing of religious edicts.
With plentiful of military and financial resources to fuel these centrifugal forces – in
sharp contrast with the austerity imposed on a large part of the world economy – dangerous
fragmentation is more ominous than the Iraqi 2006-07 conflagration initiated with the
bombing of al-Askari shrine in Samarra. The humanitarian cost is stranger to no one, both
the result of decades of war and sanctions in Iraq and the fresher hemorrhage in Syria.
Deep mental health problems in the region, affecting both victims and victimizers, remain
understudied but should also be highlighted.