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POPULISM AND NATIONALISM VERSUS EUROPEANISM
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a greater or lesser extent to achieve their politi-
cal objectives. Podemos, a party that emerged
from the 2011 M15 indignant movement in
Spain, has appropriated various aspects of M5S
culture such as the use of the term “caste” to
denigrate more established rivals and the prac-
tice of organising militants into circles. Like their
counterparts in Italy, some of its leaders have
frequently purported to lead a “movement”
unaligned with either the right or left.
Pretensions notwithstanding, Podemos is an al-
liance of left-wing political forces whose ideolo-
gies range from radical anti-capitalism to an
academic form of populism rooted in the post-
Marxist theories of Ernesto Laclau. Syriza, an al-
liance of left-wing parties in Greece that swept
into power in 2015 on the basis of populist
promises of political renovation and rebellion
against EU-imposed bailout conditions it has
unsurprisingly been unable to make good on,
has since formed a coalition government with
the radical right-wing nationalist Independent
Greeks in order to survive. Nevertheless, despite
their common use of populist tactics such as
framing themselves as the sole defenders of the
people against the rest of the world and propos-
ing unworkable solutions, there is a fundamen-
tal difference between these parties and their
alt-right counterparts: the two pursue diametri-
cally opposed objectives. Whereas the ultimate
goal of the radical right is to strengthen capital-
ism, that of the radical left is to dismantle or, at
least, control it.
The political consequences of the
economic crisis
The rise of populism and nationalism has un-
doubtedly been the gravest consequence of the
economic crisis, the management of which here
in Europe has been disastrous for many, but not
all, countries and strata of society. Public debt
has reached new heights, industrial and busi-
ness sectors have been weakened, unemploy-
ment has risen sharply and labour rights and
social services and benefits have deteriorated
throughout the EU, all of which has led to a
growing, widespread sensation of uncertainty.
Looking at the situation from a deeper perspec-
tive, it is now clear that given the notable struc-
tural differences in the various economies with-
in the Union, what was good for some was
detrimental to others. The imposition of the vi-
sion of the most powerful member state under
the leadership of Angela Merkel, based as it was
on fiscal retrenchment and reduced demand,
has worked to the advantage of exporting
countries within the Union such as Germany but
been disastrous for others whose upwardly spi-
ralling burdens of sovereign debt have left them
with unmanageable account deficits they have
no option to address by means of monetary de-
valuation. The Obama administration, in con-
trast, took a far different, neo-Keynesian ap-
proach to the crisis in the United States,
employing a strategy of stimulating investment
and demand that has produced far better re-
sults.
Neoliberal economic prescriptions are falla-
cious and crafted solely to benefit capitalist in-
terests. If lowering taxes and cutting social ser-
vices were an effective means of balancing
budgets, Scandinavian countries would be the
laggards of Europe and those along its southern
rim its greatest success stories. In reality, things
work the other way around. Robust tax reve-
nues, public investment and redistribution are
needed to stimulate demand and economic
growth. The burden of the crisis has fallen on
the shoulders of the middle class and workers,
provoking new levels of inequality, leaving many