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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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instruments, with the aim of making the
principle of strategic autonomy a reality.
– In this regard, and building on the European
Council position described in the previous
point, on 6 March 2017 the Council of
Foreign Affairs decided to create an opera-
tional command, which would take immedi-
ate charge of operations already in progress.
This office – conceived as an embryonic
military HQ – was not created, because the
UK exercised its veto on the basis that such
an HQ should be the reserve of NATO.
These decisions are just some of the meas-
ures designed to illustrate the development and
application of the first steps towards a joint de-
fence policy, and it seems likely that more will
be adopted over the coming year.
Implications of Brexit for European defence
policy
On 29 March 2017, London triggered Article
50, giving notification of the UK’s intention to
leave the EU. Taking into account the role played
by the UK over the last 45 years – one that has
been characterised by obstruction of attempts
to promote integration, and opposition towards
the federal project that is the driver of European
construction – the UK’s exit, in principle, repre-
sents an opportunity for the EU, facilitating co-
hesion (as has been demonstrated during the
nine months since the referendum vote), and
opening the way for the process of deepening
the EU.
In the sphere of defence policy, it is impor-
tant to remember that the CSDP was influenced
by the Franco-British Saint Malo Declaration (by
Chirac and Blair), and that the UK played a key
role in the early military crisis management op-
erations during the first decade of the twenty-
first century. However, when the Conservatives
came to power in 2010, participation in such
operations was reduced, reflecting a decision to
emphasise NATO operations. As a result, the UK
is only the fifth-largest contributor to CSDP mil-
itary operations – behind France, Italy, Germany
and Spain – and the seventh-largest contributor
to civil operations.
Military experts therefore believe that the UK
is not essential to European defence, preferring
to emphasise Atlantic defence instead. At the
same time, the White Paper on Brexit presented
by Theresa May on 14 February stresses her
commitment to maintaining security and de-
fence cooperation with the EU and its member
states. It will be interesting to see what form
this relationship takes.
Despite being announced at the same time
as the Brexit referendum, the Global Strategy
has been applied and developed through the
medium of a European defence policy. Although
the UK has put some obstacles in its path, this
has not prevented implementation of the strat-
egy. It therefore seems likely that, while Brexit
may make the challenge of developing a de-
fence policy more difficult, it will not constitute
an insurmountable barrier.
Pending issues in the development of
European defence policy
Although significant steps have been taken
within the framework of the Global Strategy
over recent months and some aspects of a de-
fence policy have been developed, there are still
a number of key issues pending if the strategy is
to be credible on the international stage.
Perhaps the first measure should be a unani-
mous decision by the Council to separate com-
mon defence from foreign policy. This, in turn,