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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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As a result, at the Atlantic Council of 10
February 2018, the United States representative
raised objections to the development of PESCO,
and these doubts have been echoed in other in-
ternational forums, such as the European Security
Conference in Europe a few days later, or the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly of March 2018.
This concern is based, among other things,
on the view held by some in the United States
that the development of the CSDP and in par-
ticular of PESCO will reduce the purchase of
military hardware from the United States.
The British paradox with respect to
defence policy and PESCO
The first thing to note is that, throughout its
membership of the EU (for more than 40 years)
the United Kingdom opposed the development
of a security and defence policy. In particular,
during the last decade it slowed down imple-
mentation of PESCO and other security and de-
fence initiatives. And the United Kingdom gov-
ernment’s letter notifying intention to withdraw
from the EU under Article 50, on 29 March
2017, specifically mentioned the possibility that,
if no acceptable economic agreement were
reached, the United Kingdom might weaken its
ties in the areas of security and defence.
A year on, the situation has changed substan-
tially and the EU has successfully concluded a
pre-agreement on the first phase of negotiations
(8 December 2017) which reflects the EU’s initial
goals rather than those of the United Kingdom,
and has also made substantial progress in the de-
velopment of its defence policy. This reflects the
cohesion between Member States, which in-
creased significantly as a result of the British
withdrawal, enabling the EU to present a united
front in its negotiations with the United Kingdom.
The paradox lies in the fact that the United
Kingdom government’s Foreign Policy, Defence
and Development report of September 2017
states that, in defence and security issues, the
United Kingdom hopes to participate decisively
in all initiatives, despite no longer being a mem-
ber of the EU. This has been confirmed by a
number of more specific public statements by
the United Kingdom.
Even more recently, at the Munich Security
Conference on 17 February 2018, Prime Minister
Theresa May called for the rapid agreement, pri-
or to the withdrawal date of 30 March 2019, of
a Defensive Alliance Treaty with the EU and par-
ticipation in the new defence structures. In other
words, after having previously opposed the de-
velopment of the defensive alliance, the United
Kingdom – following its decision to leave the EU
– now wants to participate in this initiative.
Following the pre-agreements adopted at
the European Council on 23 March 2018 –
which establishes a transition period of 21
months following the United Kingdom’s depar-
ture on 30 March 2019, taking us up to 31
December 2020 – almost all of the elements of
the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU
will be extended, other than its participation in
European institutions. As a result, its existing se-
curity and defence commitments will also be
extended until the end of 2020.
However, the future relationship between
the EU and the United Kingdom in all spheres
– including security and defence – will have to
be agreed in the coming months. This will be far
from easy. In principle, there are no plans to ex-
tend the transition period, although such a de-
velopment cannot be ruled out. It is worth not-
ing that the United Kingdom, which wanted a
rapid and comprehensive withdrawal, was now
the one asking for the final exit date to be post-
poned through a transition period of two or