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INTRODUCTION. THE RESURGENCE OF NATIONALISM
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Authoritarianism creates the ideal breeding ground for outbreaks of
xenophobia, the sentiment driving the regrettable boycott of the European
Commission’s migration and asylum policy mounted in large part by the
Visegrad group countries, several of which have been major recipients of
EU structural and investment funds (which, in the case of Poland, cover
60 % of public investment expenditure). The refusal of these states to help
relieve the burden the influx of the millions of asylum seekers fleeing wars
in the Middle East supposed for Greece and Italy constituted nothing less
than a violation of the Geneva Convention on refugees.
In addition, we face an external threat of an economic nature champi-
oned by Donald Trump: protectionism. Nothing could be farther from the
EU philosophy of trade.
Trade protectionism is but one more expression of populist nationalism,
in this particular case being imposed by a third country.
This set of problems so counter to the idea of Europe could precipitate
what could hurt the Union the most: divisions between Member States. A
return to the Europe of Westphalia.
One cannot ignore the growing tendency of Member States to form
“clubs” based on affinities that routinely come up with proposals that
diverge from, or are occasionally incompatible with, the thrust of EU poli-
cy on economic matters, foreign affairs, migration and other issues. We
have the Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland, Denmark), the Baltic countries
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Slovakia, Poland), the Central European countries (Germany,
Austria, The Netherlands), the Southern or Mediterranean countries
(France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta, Cyprus, Portugal) and so on.
There is nevertheless a flipside to the coin, which is the undeniable
desire on the part of European citizens to remain in the Union and the euro
and their satisfaction with being a part of the European project. On the
average, over 70 % of the citizens of EU countries hold firm to these con-
victions. We must not forget that the majority parties in leading Member
States (Germany and France most notably in terms of visibility, but Spain
and Italy as well) are staunchly pro-European. That unquestionable pro-
gress has been made in policy areas such as security and defence and in-
ternational cooperation and development. That there has been a firm con-
sensus about how to face the challenge of Brexit. And that the European
Central Bank is a powerful Institution that conveyed a crucial sense of se-
curity during the first few years of the crisis. Despite these certainties, it
remains clear that the European project will flounder if we attempt to
tackle the challenges of globalisation within the narrow confines of state