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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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one commissioner per country has shaped this
model of election that, in any case, requires ap-
proval one-by-one and as a whole by the Parlia-
ment, after gruelling appearances before the
appropriate parliamentary committees accord-
ing to the portfolio to be taken on, where can-
didates have to demonstrate their professional
preparation and proficiency in the specific field.
It is important to point out the Parliament’s role
in that process, insomuch as in most countries
around us it plays no part in choosing the gov-
ernment team. So, in the selection process for
“ministers”, responsibility for nominating is di-
vided among the Member States and the Presi-
dent of the Commission and, moreover, the
Parliament has an essential power of veto.
Third, and lastly, the Union has two legisla-
tive chambers, the Council –our Senate– and
the European Parliament. The general public is
not particularly aware if this bicameral model
and there is frequent confusion between the
Council and the European Council. In the ordi-
nary legislative procedure, the legislative texts
submitted by the Commission in response to
express requests from the European Council,
but also acting on its own initiative, are sent si-
multaneously to the Parliament and the Council
and both chambers have to amend and adopt
the bill. On the one hand, the Parliament dis-
cusses the bill in the appropriate committee and
then it has to be adopted in a plenary session.
On the other, the Council, made up of the na-
tional ministers of the issue of interest in ques-
tion, must produce its own text, where the vote
of each minister is weighted according to the
size of their population, in the style of the Ger-
man Bundesrat. Council debates are led by a
six-month rotating presidency, exercised by the
governments of the Member States.
Once a text is approved in both chambers,
the process of negotiation between them
begins. Under the technical assistance of the
Commission, it must end in an agreement (or
not) between the parties, to be approved again
by the Parliament and the Council. In commu-
nity terminology, this process of negotiation is
called “trialogue”.
In any case, there is a part of the legislation
over which the Parliament does not have juris-
diction, so that the legislative procedure is con-
centrated exclusively with the Council. Under
this model, the Parliament has a consultative
responsibility that should be heeded by the
Council, although at the present time we do not
know to what extent the Member States re-
spond to parliamentary suggestions. Still, the
Lisbon Treaty minimised the issues subject to the
consultation process and, therefore, outside the
ordinary legislative procedure (since 2014, there
have been 274 matters subject to codecision
and 73 subject to Consultation). On the other
hand, on certain matters, such as taxation, the
Treaty requires the unanimity of the Council,
and not a qualified majority, which means that
neither the Parliament nor the Council have
unique competences.
With this simple presentation of the institu-
tional framework, it is easier to understand the
Parliament’s legislative and oversight role, al-
though there are other complexities that war-
rant analysis in order to have an overall frame-
work for understanding the role of the Parliament
in its entirety.
The para-institutional changes
of the last term
From the onset of the economic crisis and espe-
cially as a result of the decisions that were grad-
ually taken, the Union’s institutional framework
has been deformed in some areas. On the one