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INEQUALITY IN EUROPE IN THE EARLY 21ST CENTURY
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manpower into a scarce commodity. The chal-
lenges posed to generational solidarity make up
a different issue that is complex enough merely
to be mentioned here without being given fur-
ther consideration. Demographic relief for the
job market, however, and its respective transfor-
mation from a “sellers’ market” into a “buyers’
market” is just one scenario. It is counteracted
by an increase in migration from labour-surplus
regions as well as the previously mentioned
prospect of a massive wave of labour-streamlin-
ing now that computers and the machines op-
erated by them have begun to think and learn.
Alternatives for the future
The erstwhile certainty of economically ad-
vanced countries ensuring prosperity for all and
of emerging countries following this model,
some earlier some later, is now a thing of the
past. The previously admired model of Germany
has come undone where social matters are con-
cerned and the models of Sweden, Denmark,
etc. are on the defensive. In large parts of the
population the new reality is being accepted
with resignation (“more is unrealistic”, “for
those who strive there are real opportunities”).
However, it seems unlikely that after the special
period of the “golden” years of welfare capital-
ism, we are about to usher in a “silver” reality,
so to speak, of the globalised, post-industrial
economy that is somewhat tougher but where,
ultimately, life is good. It rather is to be expected
that the challenges of creating sustainable soci-
eties will only grow. The key to this expectation
is once again the labour market.
Societal integration through the labour mar-
ket in which any person willing to work finds an
“acceptable” subsistence (and which also leaves
space for lasting human relations ) can be called
into question merely by the fact that under the
pressure of economic changes , the power
structures collapse that have once “wrested”
that integration from the market. The upshot
would be the proliferation of the American,
British and German segmentation pattern. Re-
gardless of how political will is developing, a
number of economic challenges are also loom-
ing which can no longer be dealt with using the
(Scandinavian, Austrian, Dutch) success recipes
of the past. In the future this may require major
corrections to be made to the labour market in
order to keep it as a social inclusion mechanism
rather than allowing it to become a social exclu-
sion mechanism. This would be the case, for
example, if the previously mentioned waves of
streamlining significantly reduce the volumes of
work needed by society. Full employment on
“acceptable” wages, i.e. without allowing a
low wage sector to emerge, would then no
longer be possible without some perceptible ad-
justments to the labour market. If earned in-
come is to remain the key mechanism of income
distribution for the masses in a socially integrat-
ed society, all of those who are able to work
must participate in this source of income. The
quantity of good jobs that corresponds to the
state of economic and technological develop-
ment would then have to be distributed in a
different way (4 instead of 3 shifts per nurse, 7
instead of 10 projects per contributor etc.). This
not at all new discussion might soon come to
the fore once more.
We can, and perhaps must at some point, go
one step further and move away from the focus
on earned income. Then there would be two
ways of counteracting societal polarisation be-
tween those with good jobs on the one hand
and precariousness on the other:
– Increase in transfer incomes paid from the
state’s coffers.