17 / 92
Daesh: a long decade of Sunni Arab alienation in Iraq and the Middle East
15
Daesh both in Iraq and in Syria, with air and humanitarian support from the US and
European countries; Shia militias, which took back a number of territories but whose
predominant role in the battle is controversial since it largely feeds the discourse, resilience
and redeployment of Islamic State; Iran, which, although challenged as a regional power,
won the Iraq War of 2003 and is set to win this new struggle due to its direct involvement
led by the major general Qassem Soleimani, head of the division of the Guardians of
the Islamic Revolution responsible for military and clandestine operations abroad. In the
middle of this equation, one decisive variable is irretrievably lacking: Sunni Arabs, who
have lived for months under the yoke of Islamic State and must become part of the military
campaign. Without such a rebalancing of forces, no revival of the political process can
truly come about in Iraq and, by extension, in Syria.
Several questions are thus raised: how to release Sunni Arabs from the grip of Daesh by
inducing them to become the principal actors of its defeat? Who are the players likely to be
mobilised in sufficient numbers to cope with this unprecedented challenge? What should
be the terms and guarantees of such mobilisation? More importantly, is it possible to curb
the dynamic of Sunni secession beyond the fight against the jihadists? Clearly, Sunni Arabs
will not rally the battle if any “after” means a return to the previous
status quo
, which was
unbearable to them.
By late summer 2014, the US launched a series of discussions with Iraqi Sunni Arab tribes
so they would cooperate again with both Washington and Baghdad. The idea was to put
together, within a year, a new tribal force inspired by the
Sahwa
and able to effectively fight
Islamic State. Retired General John Allen, former deputy commander of US forces in Al-
Anbar and appointed as special presidential envoy for the coalition to counter Daesh, aimed
to press his close contacts with the tribes to set in motion a “
Sahwa
2.0.” and make it a pillar
of his strategy. This time, the tribes would be mobilised within an institutional framework,
namely a national guard flanked by American military advisers and Special Forces, and
cooperating with the army, the Kurdish peshmergas as well as other self-defence groups.
While promising, so far this policy has hardly materialised. Firstly, the
Sahwa
left a
legacy darker than it appears at first sight, borne out of rivalries between Sunni sheikhs,
suspicions of corruption and financial dependence on the US and the Iraqi government.
Secondly, the tribes have been divided between support to jihadists and their outright
rejection, some sheikhs having even “lost” members of their clans along the way. This
dynamic makes the creation of a coherent force an extremely complex process. Daesh
also anticipated the threat and murdered hundreds of tribesmen who had declared their
readiness to take up arms against its members. Much was expected from the new Iraqi
cabinet headed by Haidar al-Abadi, chosen to normalise relations with Sunni Arabs and
supposed to supply arms to Sunni Arab provinces. However, the latter received no serious
military equipment from Baghdad and often had to go and purchase their weapons on
the black market. The Islamic State literally disaggregated entire tribes, reducing Sunni
tribal influence in Iraq even further. The gap between opposing Sunni Arabs and the
government may have now become unbridgeable. Many saw al-Abadi’s accession to power
as a mere perpetuation of the legacy of his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki, who had not