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Myriam Benraad
armed the tribes despite his promises. And many have denounced the “militiasation” of the
state apparatus, whose leaders, mostly Shia, have refused since 2011 to concede regional
autonomy to Sunni Arab populations.
The lack of relays in Baghdad and in the provinces further complicates this situation
and incites neighbouring Sunni Arab regimes to multiply interferences to counter the rise of
political Shiism and Iran. Amid succession and intervention against Houthi rebels in Yemen
to reaffirm its primacy, Saudi Arabia has provided continued support to Sunni Arabs in Iraq
since 2003, more particularly on a financial level. Because of the threats made by Daesh
(which includes several thousand Saudi fighters), the kingdom has recently turned to large
Sunni tribal confederations (such as the Shammar, related to the ruling family and present
in both Iraq and Syria) to mobilise them against Islamic State. Jordan has followed a similar
policy and shelled Raqqah in April 2015, Islamic State’s Syrian stronghold, in response
to the murder of Jordanian pilot Mouath al-Kassasbeh. With regard to Turkey and Qatar,
these countries formally support the Sunni Arab armed opposition, unrelated to Daesh but
mostly jihadist, and continue to display an ambiguous attitude. Ankara is indeed suspected of
providing backing to Islamic State, passive (as in Kobane when the Turkish army remained
motionless and did not assist Syrian Kurds) or active (in the form of arms transfers and flows
of fighters). Doha, meanwhile, is reported to have funded some elements of Daesh.
As a conclusion
Islamic State’s longevity in spite of a sustained campaign of air strikes has elicited
significant worry within the highest spheres of Western decision-making, especially among
those who, somehow naively, thought they were waging a war on a “classic” terrorist
organisation. In June 2015, at a forum in Doha, General Allen himself acknowledged that
the battle could take a generation or more. In the first semester of 2015, jihadist recruits
have increased from 10,000 to more than 30,000 in both Iraq and Syria according to
reliable sources. Such an increase is not benign: it testifies to the strength of Islamic State’s
political enterprise and its capacity to mobilise and regenerate. Moreover, if the solution
remains irrevocably political in the long run, it will certainly not be the one that the West
wishes for. For over a decade, Sunni Arabs in Iraq have been marginalised in relation to
all matters concerning their future and the crisis of representation affecting them is deep,
if not already irreversible. Struck by measures deemed unjust, they have no real hope for a
change today, especially when Baghdad calls on Shia militias to “free” them.
The formation of a new and legitimate Sunni Arab leadership, offering a substitute to both
Islamic State and Shia predominance in Iraq, is the cornerstone of any way out of the current
crisis. For now, Sunni Arabs have not been unable to say who represents them and who
is legitimate. Nationalists? Baathists? Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood? Jihadists?
They no longer seem interested in appeasing relations with Baghdad and Damascus, and
instead appear to be engaged in open secession, which, with or without Daesh, should persist,
thus forcing the international community to entirely rethink both its strategy and vision.