THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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the return of Sevastopol to Russia a year later.

Nevertheless, then-President Boris Yeltsin was

far too beleaguered by Russia’s waning influ-

ence in world affairs to voice public support for

either initiative. In December 1994, representa-

tives of the Russian Federation, the United

States and the United Kingdom met in Budapest

to sign the Budapest Memorandum on Security

Assurances, a document that contained pledges

to respect the territorial and political integrity of

Ukraine negotiated in exchange for Ukrainian

nuclear disarmament. By signing this memoran-

dum, Moscow took the historic step of uncon-

ditionally recognising Ukraine’s borders and its

right to territorial integrity (Article 1). This rec-

ognition was ratified in Articles 2 and 3 of the

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and

Partnership signed by both countries in 1997

immediately after they had reached an agree-

ment on the division of the Black Sea fleet and

Russia’s use of Sevastopol as a naval base.

It is clear that Russia’s annexation of Crimea

violated not only the Budapest Memorandum

on Security Assurances and the Treaty of

Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, but

the Helsinki Final Act, which enshrined the right

of territorial integrity, as well. Nevertheless, it is

just as clear that the Crimean question has been

a pending issue since the dissolution of the

USSR and that the annexation is the result of an

historic reality confirmed at the polls by the ma-

jority of Crimean voters that might have been

facilitated by Russian intervention but was clear-

ly the will of the people. Viewed from a realistic

perspective, recognised or not, it is a

fait accom-

pli

not at all likely to be reversed. On 27 March,

The United Nations General Assembly approved

a non-binding resolution that declared the inva-

lidity of the referendum and the annexation.

Although both have also been rejected by the

United States and the European Council in the

name of the 28 EU Member States, it must be

admitted that the fact of their having recog-

nised the unilateral independence of Kosovo in

2008 leaves many of these countries without

valid political or legal arguments for refusing to

respect the decision of the inhabitants of Crimea

and Sevastopol.

The Donbass conflict

Protests against the Kyiv regime broke out in

early March 2014 in most of the eastern and

southern areas of the country that had signifi-

cant ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking minor-

ities including Odessa, where they were quickly

suppressed, but were strongest in the Donbass,

an industrial and mining region on its eastern

border with Russia. Pro-Russian separatists seized

government buildings where they raised Russian

flags. Independent peoples’ republics were de-

clared in Donetsk (DPR) and Kharkiv on April 7

and Luhansk (LPR) on the 28

Kyiv deployed troops on 14 April to crush the

rebellion. Despite an agreement to halt all armed

combat reached on 17 April in Geneva between

Ukraine, Russia, the European Union and the

United States, the Ukrainian army continued its

offensive, which was successful at first due to

the separatists’ lack of organisation and sup-

plies. Although Ukrainian troops were able to

take Kharkiv and parts of the oblasts of Donetsk

and Luhansk, large expanses of the latter two,

including their capital cities, resisted and the

lines of confrontation between the two sides

hardened. The Kyiv government subsequently

accused Russia of supplying the separatists with

heavy weapons and covert military personnel.

The turnout was high for referendums held

in the RPD and the RPL on 11 May in which

voters expressed overwhelming support for