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THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE AND RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND RUSSIA

103

Primer Minister Yatsenyuk, who won election in

the wake of a narrow People’s Front victory over

the Petro Poroshenko Bloc in parliamentary

elections held on 26 October, has stated that at

least 12 billion euros will be needed to get the

Ukrainian economy back on track. The EU has

approved three successive aid packets for

Ukraine worth a total of 3.2 billion euros, but

has also called upon the Kyiv government to im-

plement deep economic, administrative and fis-

cal reforms and eliminate the corruption and

cronyism that continue to be at the heart of

many of the country’s problems. The

International Monetary Fund took action in

February, approving 15.5 billion euros in loan

money contingent on compliance with a four-

year economic and political reform programme.

From the outset of the crisis, the EU has

closely coordinated its policy –including points

related to sanctions– with policies pursued by

the US and other countries such as Canada and

Norway. However, it became evident in early

2015 that the perspectives of leaders on differ-

ent sides of the Atlantic were less than fully

aligned when politicians in Washington grow-

ing increasingly sceptical of the outlook for a

negotiated solution began to talk about the

possibility of military aid for Ukraine. European

interests obviously differ from those of the US,

which has fewer commercial ties with Russia

and is not reliant on Russia for energy.

There are also differences of opinion within

the EU regarding the approach that Europe

should adopt towards the Ukrainian conflict,

and by extension, its relations with Russia.

Backed by the United Kingdom, Baltic countries

such as Estonia and Latvia, both which have

Russian minorities subject to official discrimina-

tion that comprise more than 25% of their pop-

ulations, and Poland, which harbours a deeply

rooted hostility towards Russia, continue to call

for a hard-line approach without concessions.

On the other hand, the majority of other

European countries including France and

Germany are more interested in seeking a nego-

tiated solution. Although tensions have been

aired, to date, the internal unity indispensable

for maintaining a successful rapport with Russia

has remained intact.

Prompted by a rapidly deteriorating situation

in January, German Chancellor Angela Merkel

and French President François Hollande flew to

the region together in February in the hope of

forging a new agreement based on the Minsk

Protocol that would halt the escalation and lead

to a definitive ceasefire. They stopped in Kyiv on

5 February before moving on to Moscow the

following day. The fruit of their efforts was a

new summit held in Minsk on 11 February at-

tended by Merkel, Hollande, Putin and Ukrainian

President Poroshenko. These leaders made a

new pact effective as of 15 February and agreed

upon a series of measures that confirm and

build upon the initial Minsk Protocol. The Minsk

II agreement calls for the creation of a security

zone of at least 50 kilometres and the imple-

mentation of constitutional reforms and special

statutes for Donetsk and Luhansk before the

end of 2015, after which the Ukraine govern-

ment will be given control of its border with

Russia, an amnesty will be declared and all for-

eign troops and arms will be withdrawn.

These new agreements made in Minsk,

which are considered to be the last opportunity

for securing peace, represent a landmark in

European policymaking, albeit tinged by the

fact the EU has no single figure with the suffi-

cient capacity to speak and negotiate in the

name of the community as a whole and must

still rely on the leaders of its most important

Member States to assume this role. It remains

to be seen if these new accords will be more