The State of the European Union 2017

BREXIT: NEGOTIATING THE UNITED KINGDOM’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION

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goods and services with the EU and with the

rest of the world.

At the Conservative Party Conference in

October 2016, the Prime Minister promised to

notify the EU of the UK’s intention to withdraw

by the end of March 2017.

She also an-

nounced that the withdrawal process would

include a Great Repeal Bill. This legislation,

which would take effect on the day the UK of-

ficially leaves the EU, would repeal the European

Communities Act 1972 and transpose EU law

into domestic law wherever possible. This body

of legislation would then be subject to review.

This is a far-reaching decision that is designed to

prevent or minimise the disastrous consequenc-

es of withdrawal without an agreement, and to

avoid creating a legal vacuum.

With respect to the future relationship, the

British government appears to be aligning itself

with a hard Brexit, one that puts control over

immigration and recovering sovereignty before

access to the European Single Market. At the

same time, May advocates the project of “a

truly global Britain”, seeking to strike trade

deals with its preferred partners – the USA and

Commonwealth countries, in particular – at the

earliest possible date. There is, however, some

debate as to whether the UK can start negotia-

tions while it remains an EU member.

It is also worth considering whether the in-

volvement of the UK Parliament, backed by the

Supreme Court ruling, might lead to an even-

tual softening of the government’s stance.

In her speech, May referred to twelve principles, al-

though only five of these actually establish the govern-

ment’s negotiating priorities. May, T.:

Speech “The govern-

ment’s negotiating objectives for exiting the EU”,

Lancaster

House, London, 17 January 2016.

However, the EU asked May not to time the announce-

ment to coincide with the 60

anniversary of the Treaty of

Rome on 25 March.

Although a majority in both Houses have ex-

pressed support for membership of the EU on

several occasions in the past, democratic im-

perative means they have no choice but to ac-

cept the referendum verdict. However, it is pos-

sible that their involvement throughout the

process – seeking to make a positive contribu-

tion without restricting the government’s room

for manoeuvre – may influence the final out-

come in favour of a softer Brexit.

Preparations within the 27-member EU

Paradoxically, the response of EU institutions to

the negotiation has been characterised by a tra-

ditionally British “wait and see” approach.

Immediately following the referendum, the EU’s

leaders agreed not to enter into any negotia-

tions (either formal or informal) before notifica-

tion of withdrawal, and to obey article 50 to the

letter.

The reason for this is that it is for the

UK, as the country that wishes to leave, to make

clear its negotiating position. Against all expec-

tations, the unity of the 27 and of the EU’s insti-

tutions has held firm, and nobody has given

way to British pressure to open up informal pre-

negotiations.

However, this does not mean that EU institu-

tions have failed to make preparations for noti-

fication. The negotiations will be led by the

European Commission, and on 27 July 2016

President Juncker appointed former commis-

sioner Barnier, a federalist who is an expert in

Schultz, M., Tusk, D., Rutte, M., Juncker, J. C.:

Joint state-

ment,

Brussels, 24 June 2016, (STATEMENT/16/2329).

As an example of European resistance to British tactics

of pre-negotiation, see: Tusk, D.:

Letter in reply to some

UK parliamentarians on the status of EU citizens in the UK

and UK citizens living and working in Europe,

29 November

2016, (Press Release 696/16).