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MEMBER STATES AND EU VALUES: THE CHALLENGE OF NATIONALISM
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and cities are establishing connections on the
basis of common interests and needs. This new
reality should be analysed and be reflected in
the context of EU decision-making.
European nationalisms in an international
context
EU progress towards political unity, which would
make it a major, autonomous power on a geo-
political plane, irritates certain extra-European
powers such as Russia. Moscow’s empathy with
ultranationalist movements in Member States is
calculated on the basis of their ability to debili-
tate the EU and the possibility of boosting its
bargaining power with trading partners previ-
ously within its sphere of political influence.
Divide et Impera
. Some right-wing extremist EU
heads of state such as Hungary’s Victor Orbán
are known for their openly pro-Putin sympa-
thies, while others, for example in Poland, feel
no affinity with Russia for historical reasons.
There is ample proof of external interference in
the Brexit referendum, recent elections in vari-
ous EU countries and even in internal national
issues like Catalan separatism on the part of
Russian hacker collectives such as Sofacy Group
(Fancy Bear) with more or less direct links to
Russian intelligence services (including the Main
Intelligence Directorate or GRU) whose activities
have ranged from targeted cyber attacks to so-
cial media disinformation campaigns that circu-
lated fake news stories favouring secessionist
elements.
These groups are not alone. Opaque organi-
sations such as the British-American consulting
firm Cambridge Analytica, founded by American
billionaire Robert Mercer and right-wing agitator
Steve Bannon (CEO of Donald Trump’s president
campaign), have employed what appear to be
illegal tactics to influence the outcomes of the
Brexit vote and elections in EU states such as the
Czech Republic. Alt-right media outlets in the
US such as Breitbart and Infowars have also
stoked the conflict in Catalonia by disseminat-
ing fake news stories in favour of Catalan inde-
pendence. The creation and development of a
strong, cohesive and independent Europe goes
down poorly with ultra-conservative elements in
Washington as well. A telling sign of the anti-EU
bias within this camp is the open support
Donald Trump and fellow ultra-conservatives ex-
pressed for Brexit (an obviously debilitating turn
of events for the Union) and their open encour-
agement for others to take the same path.
Bannon devoted the better part of March to a
whistle-stop tour of Europe during which he
met with ultranationalists across the continent
and headlined a conference marking the re-
branding of France’s right-wing National Front.
China, meanwhile, continues to pursue a
subtler Trojan horse strategy of economic pen-
etration that began with the purchase of a
Greek port (El Piraeus) and continued with the
creation of the 16+1 group as part of a project
focused on “boosting trade and economic co-
operation”. The 16+1 framework, under which
the 1 stands for China and the other 16 mem-
bers represent a vast swath of Eastern Europe
encompassing the Baltic states, the V4 and the
eastern and western Balkans, includes 11 EU
Member States that could be possibly be tempt-
ed to adopt certain positions within community
institutions on issues related to China in ex-
change for Chinese investment in infrastructure
at home.