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Daesh: a long decade of Sunni Arab alienation in Iraq and the Middle East
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the group historically appeared, and it is also in Iraq that its heteroclite elite formed itself:
longstanding Salafists, embittered former Baathists, officers and paramilitaries, all of whom
converged toward a project, the so-called “caliphate,” stamped with the seal of instant and
timeless Sunni revenge.
Genuine popular anchorage
The limits of the coalition’s operations targeted at Daesh since 2014 have much to do
with this strong local anchorage, which led to the fall of Fallujah, Mosul and numerous
other cities. In most cases, an agreement was made ahead between tribes, notables and
jihadists, to “liberate” territories against what was perceived as “occupation” by the Iraqi
army, following that of the US military. In Syria, the leaders of Islamic State were able to
convince Sunni Arab populations in the border provinces of the rightness of their design,
particularly as the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad intensified its repression and the ranks
of the opposition crumbled. Many armed factions tended either to side with Daesh for the
sake of tactical victory against the regime, its allies and Iran, or to continue fighting in other
lands as yet unconquered.
As a result, when Islamic State launched its conquest, it was on favourable ground.
The first factor to its success was unprecedented dissatisfaction among Sunni Arabs with
the centres of power, mixed, in the case of Iraq, with the mourning of an era when a
faction of Sunni Arabs controlled the state apparatus and the sense that Shia only sought to
erase Sunnism. From this standpoint, Daesh was seen as the instrument, although openly
barbaric, to recapture power and “re-Sunnify” Iraq. Such an evolution contrasted with the
nationalist discourse that Sunni Arabs had traditionally embraced. Islamic State cleverly
exploited resentment in the regions it penetrated to garner popular support (or at least a
passive attitude from the population), while at first offering repentance to the tribes that
had formerly allied themselves with the US and the Iraqi authorities.
Once established, Islamic State strove to win hearts and minds by replicating a strategy
used by many other Islamist groups: restoring security, justice and basic services (electricity,
drinking water and sewage), creating jobs, fighting corruption. The quest for security and
justice was particularly vivid among Sunni Arabs, repressed and virtually stripped of their
citizenship by the central government. In 2013, just before the final assault, sixty per cent
of Sunni Arabs in Iraq had lost confidence in the existing judicial system, while eighty
per cent of Mosul’s residents did not feel safe faced with an army that had multiplied
checkpoints, extorted local inhabitants and maintained shortage. Sunni Arabs also feared
Shia militias coming to their neighbourhoods – including the Popular Mobilisation Forces,
al-Hashd al-Shaabi
, comprising between 60,000 and 120,000 men – sponsored by Baghdad
and Tehran. In this environment, Daesh was primarily seen by a majority of Sunni Arabs
as a remedy for all ills.
At the same time, adhesion to the so-called “caliphate” has substantially differed from
one region to the other, and diminished as the abuses committed by jihadists have spread. A
number of Sunni Muslims, including insurgent forces like the Islamic Army in Iraq, which
repeatedly refused to swear allegiance to Islamic State’s emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, have