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Iraq after ISIS: Shia militancy and Iranian influence
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this trend of cooperation will continue given the successful nuclear deal between Iran and
the P5+1 in July 2015. Of course, it’s politically sensitive for either side to admit they’re
working together in Iraq as Iran is still viewed as a state sponsor of terrorism for the US and
many in Iran still view the US as the “Great Satan”.
Despite the rhetoric from both Washington and Tehran, there is clearly intelligence
cooperation in Iraq – albeit “indirectly” through the Iraqi government. US intelligence
to the Iraqis is shared with the Iranians. The Americans know this and the Iranians know
the Americans know this. The Americans even paved the way for the liberation of Tikrit in
April with anti-ISIS airstrikes as Iranian-backed paramilitaries groups were supporting the
Iraqi government forces.
4
A pool of Shia militias
Shia militancy in Iraq has a long history and they were not – by and large – a product
of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. Armed groups in Iraq initially began as a reaction
to the sectarian policies of the Ba’ath regime in the 1970s, even before the success of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, which was – and continues to be – a source of funds, arms,
training and support for these groups.
Tehran galvanized and bolstered these groups as Iraqi Shia began fleeing the Ba’athist
government crackdowns to neighboring Iran. As with Lebanon, in Iraq there were splits
within the Shia Arab community over the direction they would take vis-à-vis Iran. In 1982,
Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim officially split from the Dawa Party to form his own political
party – the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq – and a paramilitary group
– the Badr Brigade – under the tutelage of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Both Dawa and Hakim began organizing military units that fought against Saddam’s
regime after the breakout of the Iraq-Iran war. In Iraq itself they were driven underground
until the 2003 Iraq invasion gave them an opportunity to flourish again.
5
Hakim returned to Iraq and his armed wing – the Badr Brigade – played a key role
in the post-2003 order, taking important positions in the newly established security
apparatuses after the Americans officially disbanded the previous military. However, Badr
also continued to operate outside the state as a distinct armed group. Added to this, Iraq
saw the emergence of the Mehdi Army born out of the large Sadrist movement that hardly
anyone outside of Iraq understood. Iran also found in the Sadrist movement a useful ally
that could cause the Americans serious damage.
Up until 2008, the militias and their control of large swathes of territory went relatively
unchallenged. They even took part in bloody skirmishes with each other and against the
new Iraqi state. In March 2008, Maliki tackled the militias head-on, first in Basra and later
in Baghdad and across the south. His operation was backed by the US and resulted in a
decisive victory for the government, as the nascent state was able to reassert lost authority.
6
4 Parker N (2015). Iraq claims victory over Islamic State. Reuters, 2 April.
5 For an overview of Shiamilitias in post-2003 Iraq, see: Thurber C (2014). Militias as sociopolitical movements:
lessons from Iraq’s armed Shia groups.
Small wars and insurgencies
, Vol. 25, No. 5-6, pp. 900-23.
6 Cochrane M (2008).
The battle for Basra
. Institute for the Study of War.