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THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO JIHADIST TERRORISM AND THE SYRIAN CONFLICT
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Affairs, which had expressed its opposition to
the PNR on the basis that it undermined a previ-
ous Directive on the protection of data, ap-
proved an agreement on principle on this issue
–contingent on a number of stringent restric-
tions– and the EU Parliament voted in favour of
the measure on April 14.
Many of the measures being adopted at
both the national and the EU level are provoking
concern among citizens from various strata of
society who are fearful that the individual lib-
erty so highly prized in any democratic society is
being traded away in the name of security. In
their opinion, measures adopted that could lead
to the slightest erosion of citizens’ rights must
meet three conditions: be absolutely necessary
to guarantee public security, demonstrate be-
yond any doubt their effectiveness and be lim-
ited in terms of time frames and scope to what
the situation at hand truly requires. It is doubt-
ful, for example, that the PNR fulfils these crite-
ria, especially in terms of effectiveness. The fact
is that almost every individual who has travelled
to a zone of conflict and returned to the EU has
been identified and monitored without the ex-
istence of the PNR. Furthermore, none of at-
tacks perpetrated in Europe can be attributed to
a lack of control of air travel.
Other measures adopted in some Member
States such as those allowing the revocation of
passports or other national identity documents
in order to prevent citizens from travelling to
zones of conflict on the basis of mere suspicions
and in the absence of a judicial sentence or res-
olution are contrary to the spirit and letter of
European rule of law. Restricting freedom of
movement within the Schengen Area on the ba-
sis of the probability at attacks may be carried
out would be playing into the hands of the ter-
rorists, even though current interest in moving
in this direction has been triggered by a desire
to hinder the flow of refugees. The adequate
exchange of information through the Schengen
Information System (SIS) is the best way to
counter any possible boon that freedom of
movement between MSs might offer terrorists.
Finally, the suppression or blocking of illicit In-
ternet sites that seek to incite violence or pro-
vide instructions for fabricating arms or carrying
out a terrorist attack are already contemplated
in the legislation of most European countries.
We must act with extreme caution regarding
other web sites that disseminate more or less
radical Islamic thought to ensure we do not end
up attacking the liberty of expression we seek
so earnestly to defend. Surveillance of commu-
nications via the Internet (which is also contem-
plated in many existing laws that deal with ter-
rorism) must be limited to cases in which there
is a firm suspicion of wrongdoing. If it is done
on a more general basis, we run the risk that
measures permitting this option will meet the
same fate as the Data Retention Directive of
2006 on the storage of telephone conversations
and other forms of electronic communication,
which was declared invalid by the European
Court of Justice in 2014 for violating fundamen-
tal rights.
European authorities are aware that the only
effective way to prevent jihadist attacks is to
build up extensive, efficient intelligence net-
works for gathering and processing information
generated by and within radical Islamist circles,
websites, mosques, prisons, and predominantly
Muslim neighbourhoods, in order to timely de-
tect spurious activities such as preparations for
an attack, the formation of terrorist cells, the
acquisition of weapons and the development of
terrorist infrastructure. It is also clear that key
suspects, especially if they have returned to Eu-
rope from zones of conflict, must be carefully
monitored. Intelligence services and security