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BREXIT: THE LAST CHANCE FOR EUROPE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM?
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towards adopting it. The same procedure for
the suspension of decision-making or legislation
and dialogue has also been put in place for
banking union to allow non-participating states
to raise reasoned opposition to the adoption of
legislation by the Council if they believe they are
affected by it.
Competitiveness and regulation (red tape)
This has arguably been the simplest part of the
agreement, even though in symbolic terms it was
highly significant for the UK, where the tabloids
delight in the myths of bureaucratic obstacles in
Brussels and anecdotes about the level of detail
that can occasionally be reached by community
regulations, such as the prohibition of abnormal-
ly curved bananas, the controversy surrounding
olive oil bottles and the temperature to be with-
stood by kitchen gloves. The commitment to
strengthen the internal market and adapt it to
the changing environment is clearly a positive
step for everyone, alongside measures to im-
prove growth, competitiveness and employment.
This will be complemented by the commitment
of EU institutions and Member States to improve
regulations, reduce administrative costs for busi-
nesses and even repeal unnecessary legislation,
with progress assessed on an annual basis. In
principle, the agreement makes it possible to re-
duce the administrative burden, implementing a
procedure for regulatory simplification without
the need for treaty change.
Anything that contributes to improving the
competitiveness of the European economy and
helps it move away from the threat of long-term
stagnation is reasonable. The issue is just how
far the process should go in terms of legislative
restraint, non-exhaustiveness and the repeal of
legislation (Mangas
op. cit.
). As Mangas argues,
the European Parliament has not taken a posi-
tion on the agreement, and it will not be easy to
convince the legislative power that it should re-
duce the rate of its regulatory activity in areas
such as the protection of consumers, workers,
health and the environment, where European
citizens require increased and fuller involvement
of European institutions (which, it goes without
saying, must also be brought closer to the peo-
ple and made more democratically accountable).
Sovereignty
David Cameron sought to ensure that the UK
will be excluded from the statement in the trea-
ty that EU membership entails the commitment
of all Member States to “ever closer union
among the peoples of Europe”. The conclusions
of the European Council on 18 and 19 February
2016 leave no room for doubt or interpretation
as to whether he achieved this. Section C
(Sovereignty) of Annex I clearly states that “refer-
ences to ever closer union do not apply to the
United Kingdom”. Cameron also managed to
achieve something else that goes beyond the de-
clarative significance of the conclusions of a
Council, with EU leaders agreeing that this new
status will be substantially incorporated into the
treaties when they are next revised. This means
that each has permanently accepted the constitu-
tional foundation of a two- or multi-speed Europe.
For the majority of political and legal ana-
lysts, this part of the agreement (alongside the
reference to the free movement of citizens) is
without doubt the most critical. The British re-
jection of the commitment to “ever closer un-
ion” –present in the treaties since 1958, when
it was included in the preamble, and since 2010
as article 1 of the Treaty on European Union–
transforms the nature of the EU. It would have