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BREXIT: THE LAST CHANCE FOR EUROPE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM?

123

forcing him to bring the date for the poll for-

ward to 2016, together with the bulk of the

renegotiation process.

David Cameron’s letter in 2015

On 10 November 2015, the British prime minis-

ter sent a letter to the presidents of the European

Council and the European Commission, and to

the heads of state and heads of government of

the Member States, setting out the four main

areas or “buckets” of Britain’s demands. The

president of the European Council, Donald Tusk

responded in a letter dated 2 February, ad-

dressed to the heads of state and government

of the Member States. The letter contains an

annex with details of the proposed Council de-

cision in response to the issues raised by the

British prime minister, which went on to form

the basis of the agreement reached in Brussels

on 18 and 19 February 2016. The day before

the Council, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Cooperation appeared before the

Congress of Deputies’ Foreign Affairs

Commission (the Mixed Commission for the EU

had yet to be formed by the new government)

to provide advance notice of the content of the

issues to be discussed at the European Council.

The UK’s relationship with Europe

For the majority of the British public, the coun-

try’s relationship with Europe, or “the

Continent”, is based more on culture and his-

tory than politics or trade. The EU is not one of

the main concerns in opinion polls, although

the political relationship with the rest of Europe

has always been extremely complicated. The

conflict goes back to the nature of the EU and

the UK, with roots in geopolitics and certain at-

titudes in the aftermath of the Second World

War (e.g., an isolationist attitude towards the

Continent, strong ties with the Commonwealth,

a false sense of economic superiority and a be-

lief in the ability to go it alone as a result of

having suffered less destruction in the war), in

addition to the birth of European integration

and the role played by the governments of the

time and their historical leaders such as Winston

Churchill and General de Gaulle.

Every British government has expressed, in

one way or another, its limited enthusiasm for

the European project. From the outset, the UK

was not among the founding members of the

project for European integration, and, since its

belated incorporation in 1973, has acted as a

brake on progress towards or discussion of fur-

ther integration. Clear examples can be found

in the rebate demanded and obtained by

Margaret Thatcher in the budget struggle of the

1980s, exemption from Schengen and the deci-

sion to stay out of the euro. The UK has also

opposed the development of the EU’s limited

social dimension; in 1992, it was exempted

from the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty

(although Tony Blair subsequently relinquished

this opt-out in 1997) and, in 2007, the effects

of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the

UK were limited by the inclusion of protocol 30

in the Treaty of Lisbon. And it has been reluctant

to participate in the area of freedom, security

and justice. Yet for all this, the United Kingdom

is not the only member of the EU in which

Euroscepticism plays a significant role in nation-

al politics, and regardless of the result of the

referendum on 23 June 2016, the damage done

to the European project may prove to be irre-

versible.