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THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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same logic as the national legislatures of the
member states (government and opposition) al-
though it is possible that it will have more pow-
er than these. What it lacks is the power to initi-
ate legislation, although this shortcoming may
be remedied through inter-institutional agree-
ments. In addition, its budget-setting powers
need to be extended to include some areas that
are not currently covered by co-legislation.
The European Parliament is becoming the most
important legislature in the world, of relevance not
only to European internal politics but also to the
development of global policy, as a voice that ex-
presses the wishes of European citizens in the
world in a way that is quite different from other
international parliaments.
In addition to using its legislative powers to
deepen the federal progress already achieved,
the European Parliament should propose a com-
prehensive alternative with the objective of
completing the European political system by
providing a new constitutional framework, and
should have a strategy for achieving this during
the 8th Legislature, as was the case during the
1st, which gave rise to the Draft Treaty of 1984,
and in driving forward the 2nd European
Convention (2002-2003), which produced the
first Constitution of the European Union.
The European Commission: towards a
democratic European government
Due to the fact that, for the first time in its history,
the European Commission derives its mandate to
a large degree from the results of elections, its
democratic legitimacy and inter-institutional po-
litical influence have increased. This means that,
with the necessary political will, the executive of
the European Union can change the direction of
European policies, replacing the strict adhesion to
austerity with public spending policies designed
to promote growth and employment. This is the
only way in which European citizens can feel fully
involved in the construction of Europe.
However, while this increased legitimacy
means that the Commission more closely re-
sembles a democratic government, it still suffers
from a degree of deficit. Under the Treaties (as
interpreted by the member states) it has been
necessary to incorporate commissioners pro-
posed by national governments. As a result, the
dual legitimacy of the Union (citizens and states)
continues to be tilted in favour of the interests
of states in terms of who exercises executive
power during the five-year legislature. By way
of compensation, the political actions of the
Commission will increasingly be influenced by
the majority within the European Parliament
that has appointed it, and such actions will have
to be consistent with the programme demo-
cratically endorsed by the chamber.
While it is true that the new Commission is
more legitimate than those that preceded it, the
effectiveness of the Commission depends on its
structure, an area in which there is plenty of
scope for improvement. For example, an exces-
sive number of Commissioners makes collective
decision-making difficult and reduces the results
of government action. Although the Juncker
Commission has developed a new system based
on team-working (referred to as “clusters”), it is
possible that this will be insufficient as there are
still too many Commissioners to whom compe-
tencies need to be attributed. The maximum
ideal number of Commissioners – which, fortu-
nately, the treaties continue to establish as being
two thirds of the number of member states –
will only be implemented with effect from 2019.
As a result, while the legitimacy of the
Juncker Commission is greater than that of any
of its predecessors, it is unclear that it will be