THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
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was conceived to eliminate industrial and agri-
cultural tariffs, open services and public pro-
curement markets, align regulation affecting
manufacturers, the banking sector, and safety
standards, set international rules on finance,
and address similar trade issues. According to
initial estimates contained in a report prepared
by the Centre for Economic Policy Research, the
increased trade and reduced tariff barriers sup-
posed by the implementation of the agreement
would increase the EU GDP by an additional
0.5%. Given that the economies of the EU and
the US together account for 46% of global GDP,
a liberalization of trade between them would
have a positive impact on the economies other
major exporting countries as well. The TTIP
agreement would also have additional positive
side effects for other countries, although it is
not yet clear if it would reinvigorate multilateral
post-Bali trade negotiations in the WTO or be
compatible with existing cross-regional free
trade agreements such as Mercosur or the new
Transpacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations, ex-
pected to be concluded in June 2015
1
.
Interestingly, as negotiations have pro-
gressed, each succeeding round has focused
less and less on economic benefits –which fur-
ther research has considerably downgraded–
and taken on a greater
political
dimension.
Since it was first discussed in June 2013, the
proposed agreement has increasingly become a
means for the partners at the negotiating table
to affirm themselves both at home and abroad.
However, further progress towards a final agree-
ment is being hampered by geopolitical shifts,
1
The TTIP and the TPP openly reject the old most-favored
nation principle –a pillar of GATT and the WTO systems– by
offering concessions and enhanced access to EU and US
markets to signatory countries only. The TPP is set to elimi-
nate trade barriers between the US and eleven Asian coun-
tries. It includes Japan but not China.
an economic slowdown in emerging markets,
and, overall, domestic political and institutional
constraints.
Geopolitical change and the TTIP
negotiations
TTIP was largely conceived as a way to rebal-
ance world power between the US and Europe
as a block and the emerging powers (BRICS).
Trade has never been neutral; it has always
been “politics by other means”, a highly sensi-
tive matter in international relations. The initia-
tion of negotiations toward a transatlantic part-
nership coincided with the first signs of a fall in
the
growth of Brazil’s domestic market, the
deceleration of the Chinese and Russian econo-
mies, and the slowdown of commodities prices.
Not surprisingly, the emerging powers such as
China, Russia, and Brazil have in some way or
another attempted to overturn the existing bal-
ance of power. China’s territorial ambitions in
Asia have triggered tensions with both the US
and Japan
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. Putin’s new Russia has been playing
the geopolitical card in the post-soviet area,
challenging Crimea and stoking the flames of
civil conflict in Ukraine. Dilma’s Brazil, despite
the rhetoric, has kept its distance from the US
in many areas, from world trade to the regional
politics (Mercosur, Unasur). Finally, although
the leaders of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, China, In-
dia, and South Africa) did not formally ex-
pressed their opposition to the TTIP agreement
as a block at the July 2014 Fortaleza Summit,
they have privately expressed their reservations
2
During the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
summit held in Beijing in November 2014, President Obama
made clear that he preferred the TTP to the Free Trade Area
of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) promoted by APEC.